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Convertible preferred stock' has become increasingly popular in
the world of merger and acquisition finance. A New York Times
article dated April 17, 19662 lists three proposed reorganizations in
which convertible preferred stock was to be issued,' and two consum-
mated reorganizations in which such convertible shares had been
issued.' Eleven days later, the Times indicated that under the terms
of the proposed International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation-
American Broadcasting Company merger, I.T.T. would issue both
common and convertible preferred shares in exchange for A.B.C. com-
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Bernard Wolfman
of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, whose comments and suggestions were
of inestimable value. The author, of course, must take full responsibility for the final
product.
t Associate, Mintz, Levin, Cohn & Glovsky, Boston, Massachusetts. B.A. 1963,
LL.B. 1966, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Massachusetts Bar.
1 This article will be concerned with preferred stock convertible at the option of
the shareholders. See 4 Z. CAvrrcH, Busncns ORGANIZATIONS wrrH TAx PLANNING,
§ 92.01(1), at 1131 n.1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as CAvrrcH].
2 Vartan, A Merger Factor: Convertibles, N.Y. Times, April 17, 1966, § 3, at
2, col. 3.
3 The proposed reorganizations cited by the Times involved the following corpora-
tions: (a) Gustin-Bacon Manufacturing Company and Certain-teed Products Corpora-
tion; (b) KVP Sutherland Paper Company and Brown Company; and (c) Filmways,
Incorporated and Seven Arts Productions, Limited. KVP Sutherland merged into
Brown on May 12, 1966; Gustin-Bacon merged into Certain-teed on July 1, 1966.
4 Convertibles were issued by Gulf and Western Industries when acquiring New
Jersey Zinc Company, and by Union Oil Company of California when acquiring Pur6
Oil Company.
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mon stock.' And in June of 1967, the Wall Street Journal carried
at least four articles involving mergers or acquisitions in which con-
vertible preferred would play a key role.6
Convertible preferred shares have become popular as a vehicle
for mergers and acquisitions for several non-tax-oriented business
reasons. Despite the fact that a convertible issue may tend to reduce
the price of outstanding common stock, an acquiring corporation will
favor a convertible over a regular preferred issue because the con-
version privilege will tend to enhance the marketability, if not the
market value, of the issue.7 This enhanced marketability may deter-
mine whether or not a desirable acquisition will occur. At the same
time, an acquiring corporation may favor a convertible preferred over
a common stock issue for two reasons. First, initial issuance of addi-
tional common stock might unduly dilute the equity position of common
shareholders of the acquiring corporation; 8 second, common stock
might be unattractive to the shareholders of the corporation to be
acquired simply because of its non-preferred status. Preferred stock
is apt to be more attractive to the investor, particularly in periods of
market decline.
Under such circumstances, convertible preferred will generally
appear to offer the best of both worlds (given a favorable exchange
rate). During critical periods, the shareholder may retain his con-
vertible preferred stock and share in the distribution of available cor-
porate earnings and profits with the assurance that his convertible
stock will be more readily marketable than ordinary preferred. During
6 N.Y. Times, April 28, 1966, at 61, col. 3.
4Wall St. J., June 6, 1967 at 8, col. 2 (Kern County Land Co. into Tenneco,
Inc.); Wall St J., June 12, 1967, at 8, col. 2 (Marquardt Corp. into Automation
Industries, Inc.) ; Wall St. J., June 15, 1967, at 9, col. 1 (Kalamazoo Paper Co. into
Georgia-Pacific Corp.); Wall St. J., June 27, 1967, at 28, col. 1 (F. M. Stamper Co.
and General Mills, Inc.).
74 CAvrrcH § 92.01(1), at 1132 n.4. But see B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. Co0rxm,
SEcuRrry ANtALYss 603 (1962). [hereinafter cited as GRArAM]. The authors suggest
that an ordinary preferred issue will have a higher market value than a convertible
issue during periods of decline. 1946-47 figures cited by them would appear to support
the conclusion. The following table is taken from GRAHAm at 603:
PRICE RECORD OF NEW PREFERRED-STOCK ISSUES OFERD Ix 1946
Price change from issue "Straight Convertible and
price to low up to July 1947 issues" participating issues
No decline 7 issues 0 issues
Declined:
0- 9.99 per cent 16 2
10-19.99 per cent 11 6
20-39.99 per cent 3 22
40 per cent or more 0 12
Totals 37 42
Average decline About 9% About 30%
8 Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 65 YALE
L.J. 909, 924 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs].
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upswings, the shareholder may convert, thereby sharing in the growth
of the company.'
Despite these non-tax oriented business factors which recommend
convertible preferred stock as a vehicle for mergers and acquisitions, a
proposed reorganization involving the issuance of convertible preferred
stock will undoubtedly fail if the shareholders of the corporation to be
acquired believe that the convertible preferred stock will constitute and
be taxed upon disposition as section 306 stock.'" In those cases in
which an acquiring corporation has issued convertible preferred stock,
the section 306 problem has undoubtedly been disposed of in a manner
favorable to shareholders of the acquired enterprise, either through the
written opinion of counsel or by means of a private Treasury ruling."
This article will first consider whether or not a favorable resolution
of the section 306 problem raised with respect to convertible preferred
stock to be issued in a corporate reorganization is justifiable, given
the purpose of section 306. In other words, should convertible pre-
ferred stock issued in a corporate reorganization constitute and be
taxed upon disposition as section 306 stock? This article will then
consider whether, under current law, convertible preferred stock does
not in fact constitute, or will not in fact be taxed upon disposition as,
section 306 stock. And finally, this article will suggest those changes
which might be made in the present law so that proper tax treatment
might be given convertible preferred stock issued in a corporate re-
organization, consistent with the purpose of section 306.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Scope and Purpose of Section 306
Both the Senate and House Committee reports on the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 indicate that section 306 was designed to
eliminate tax-favored preferred stock "bailouts." 1 The word "bail-
out" evolved long before 1954, to describe the device whereby share-
94 CAVITcH §92.01(1), at 1133-34. Kanter, Voting Preferred Stock Given in
"B" Reorganization May Be Section 306 Stock, 39 TAxEs 88, 89 (1961) [herein-
after cited as Kanter, Preferred Stock in "B" Reorganization] ; Vartan, supra note 2.
It is interesting to note that two authorities believe that convertibles are for the
speculative investor. 1 A. DwING, THE FiNANCIL PoLicy OF CORpORATioNS 262
(1953); GRAHAm 601. Query whether the shareholders of an acquired corporation
are primarily interested in speculation.
10 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 306.
11 See 1 CCH SixcLArR-MunAY CAP. CHANGES REP. 1391, 1529, A-348; 4 CCH
SI1cLAm-MVRRAY CAP'. CHANGEs RE. P-345, for examples of companies which
evidently have sought such advice.
2 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954).
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holders "bailed" accumulated earnings and profits out of a corporation
at capital gains rates, without diluting their common equity position.p
The classic pre-1954 bailout case is Chamberlin v. Commissioner.4
In Chamberlin, redeemable preferred dividend shares were issued pro
rata to the common shareholders of a small, closely held corporation.
Thereafter, the preferred shares were sold by the common shareholders
to two insurance companies pursuant to the terms of a purchase agree-
ment executed after issuance of the additional stock. Under the terms
of the purchase agreement, all of the preferred shares were to be re-
deemed by the issuing corporation over a seven-year period, so that
ultimately the insurance companies would be reimbursed for their cash
outlay. As a result of the transactions, the common shareholders of
the issuing corporation received cash while retaining their pre-dividend
equity position. The insurance companies, on the other hand, were
assured of a small fee-the difference between the purchase and re-
demption prices-for their participation. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the proceeds of the sale of the preferred stock
to the insurance companies did not constitute ordinary income to the
common shareholders, rejecting the argument that the transaction
in reality represented a distribution of accumulated earnings and
profits. The common shareholders were therefore taxed only at capital
gains rates.
Chamberlin provoked congressional enactment of a new statutory
provision-section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
provides that the disposition of certain stock, designated as "section
306 stock," will give rise to ordinary income. Although section 306
was designed primarily in order to avoid Chamberlin-type bailouts, 5 the
fact that section 306 stock is defined '6 to include more than an ordinary
preferred stock dividend issued to the holders of common stock indi-
cates that Congress, in enacting section 306, intended to discourage
the use of all bailout devices involving the issuance of additional
shares of stock.
Thus, in the definitional provisions of section 306, Congress
included a subsection relating to shares issued in recapitalizations,
13 "Bailouts" are defined briefly in the following articles: Alexander & Landis,
Bail-outs 909-10; Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau, & Warren, The Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Reorganizations, 68
HAgv. L. Rnv. 393, 403 (1955); Trimble, The Treatment of Preferred Stock Dis-
tributions in Reorganizations Under Section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 19 TAx L. R-v. 345 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Trimble, Treatment of Pre-
ferred Stock Distributions].
14207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1959). The facts
of Chamberlin are clearly set forth in SEcriON 306 STOCK, TAX MANAGEMENT PORT-
FOLIO No. 85, at 7-8 (1963).
15 See Trimble, Treatment of Preferred Stock Distributions 351, 353.
1 6 INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(c).
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reorganizations and corporate divisions. 7 Recapitalizations were in-
cluded because they are closely akin to transactions involving the
issuance of a pure stock dividend. If, for example, a corporation with
only twenty-dollar par common shares issued and outstanding issues
five preferred shares and five forty-dollar par common shares in ex-
change for ten twenty-dollar par common shares, the net result will be
the same as though the corporation had in the first instance issued a
preferred stock dividend. Similarly, reorganizations and divisions may
involve a disguised corporate dividend. If, for example, Corporation A
merges into Corporation B, and if the shareholders of Corporation A
receive, in exchange for their common shares, both preferred and
common stock in Corporation B, the net result may be the same as
though prior to the merger Corporation A had issued a preferred stock
dividend, and thereafter the shareholders of Corporation A had received
common stock of Corporation B in exchange for their common shares
of A and preferred stock of B in exchange for their preferred stock
dividend.
In addition to recognizing the bailout potential of recapitalizations,
reorganizations and divisions, Congress, in enacting section 306, recog-
nized the fact that a bailout of earnings and profits might occur despite
the absence of shareholder motivation to avoid an ordinary income tax.
Thus, section 306 stock need not be issued in a transaction "having as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax." Is
Section 306(b) (4) does provide that upon the disposition of section
306 stock, a capital gains as opposed to an ordinary income tax will
be imposed if it can be established that the distribution and/or dis-
position of the stock were not in pursuance of a plan having tax
avoidance as one of its principal purposes. But section 306(b) (4)
does not purport to affect the definition of section 306 stock, in that,
by its terms, it requires proof that the disposition of stock was not
in pursuance of a tax avoidance scheme. Section 306 raises two
separate issues, the second of which can be resolved only upon the
disposition of newly distributed shares.' 9 Thus, the term "bailout"
will be used throughout this article in reference to any device, regardless
of motive, by which accumulated earnings and profits can be withdrawn
from a corporation in such a way that under ordinary circumstances
a capital gains tax would be imposed without a substantial shift in
common equity position.
17 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §306(c) (1) (B).
18 Ixr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 306(b) (4).
19 In light of the discussion concerning motive, it is interesting to note Trinble's
suggestion: § 306(b) (4) implies that Congress, in enacting § 306, intended to discour-
age only Chamberlin-type "maneuvers." Trimble, Treatment of Preferred Stock
Distributions 353.
1968]
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Because section 306 stock need not be issued in a transaction
having tax avoidance as one of its principal purposes and may be
issued in a recapitalization, reorganization or corporate division, it
would seem clear that Congress, in enacting section 306, intended to
do more than discourage Chamberlin-type bailouts. But in one respect,
Congress apparently intended to do no more. Generally, section 306
stock would appear to consist only of preferred stock issued with
respect to common.2°
Sections 306(c) (1) (A) and (B) of the Code indicate that
common stock issued with respect to common, whether as a stock
dividend or as part of a corporate reorganization, division or re-
capitalization, can under no circumstances be characterized as section
306 stock. These sections are sound, given the purpose of section 306.
As a practical matter, common stock issued with respect to common
will not enable shareholders to bail earnings and profits out of an
enterprise at favorable capital gains rates. Preferred stock is peculiarly
suited to a bailout of earnings and profits because preferred stock may
be, and generally is, redeemable at the option of the issuing corporation.
When preferred dividend shares are redeemed, accumulated earnings
and profits are withdrawn from the issuing or acquired corporation.
Common stock, on the other hand, generally is not redeemable; "
and indeed the law of some jurisdictions may prohibit the issuance of
redeemable common shares.'2
Even assuming, however, that common shares generally were
redeemable, so that their issuance would enable common shareholders
to withdraw accumulated earnings and profits from an enterprise by
means of a redemption, section 302 1 would appear to prevent with-
drawals at favorable capital gains rates. Section 302 provides that a
redemption will give rise to a capital gains tax only if it is in complete
termination of a shareholder's equity interest in an enterprise, if it is
not essentially equivalent to a dividend, or if it is substantially dis-
proportionate.2 4  The redemption of common dividend shares issued
to common shareholders on either a pro rata or a non-pro rata basis,
generally will satisfy none of the prerequisites for capital gains treat-
ment under section 302, and thus an ordinary income tax will be
imposed (and a bailout foreclosed).
It is true that, in the typical bailout situation, the section 302
hurdles can be overcome by the sale of dividend shares to a third party,
20 This is preferred stock issued to common shareholders. See INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 306(e).2lAlexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 919 n.30.
22Note, Callable Common Stock, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1240, 1243 (1955).
2 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302.
24See the discussion of § 302 at text accompanying notes 145-47 infra.
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in whose hands the shares subsequently are redeemed. But if redeem-
able common shares are issued to common shareholders on a dividend
basis, the shareholders will be reluctant to sell their shares to a third
party with the expectation that the shares will subsequently be re-
deemed, for a number of circumstances might prevent the redemption 25
and thereby cause a dilution of their existing equity position.
Just as common stock issued with respect to common is unsuited
to a bailout of accumulated earnings and profits, so also is common
stock issued with respect to preferred unsuited to such a bailout. Sec-
tion 306 (c) (1) (B) recognizes this by providing that no common stock
issued in a corporate reorganization, division or recapitalization may
constitute section 306 stock. On the other hand, one may question
why section 306(c) (1) (A), dealing with section 306 stock dividends,
excludes only common stock issued with respect to common. It could
be that Congress felt it unnecessary to exclude common stock dividends
issued with respect to preferred due to their infrequent use.
Common stock issued with respect to preferred is unsuited to a
bailout of earnings and profits for two basic reasons. First, it is un-
likely that common shareholders will authorize the issuance of a
common stock dividend to the holders of preferred shares alone, for
if the dividend shares are not or cannot be redeemed, the equity
position of the original common shareholders will be diluted. Second,
if a redeemable common stock dividend is issued to preferred share-
holders who otherwise own no common stock, the equity position of
these shareholders will be increased, so that subsequent redemption
of the dividend shares will result in a dilution of their equity position
and will undoubtedly be substantially disproportionate pursuant to the
provisions of section 302 28 (assuming that the common shares carry
voting rights and the preferred shares are non-voting).
Only preferred stock, then, can constitute section 306 stock. Tech-
nically, section 306 preferred stock may be issued with respect to either
common or preferred shares, for there are no Code provisions indi-
cating that section 306 preferred stock must be issued with respect to
common.2 But, generally speaking, section 306 preferred stock will
be issued only with respect to common,28 for it is only in rare instances
25 For example, a controlling shareholder and director, initially in favor of
redemption, ultimately might vote against redemption of the common dividend shares.2 6 INT. REv. COD. of 1954, § 302(b) (2).
2 7See Trimble, Treatment of Preferred Stock Distributions 352.
25The Treasury has on occasion maintained that a preferred stock dividend
issued with respect to preferred constitutes § 306 stock. Eisenberg, Corporte Reor-
ganization Problems with Redemptions and Preferred Stock, 25 J. TAXATION 278, 281
(1966). Query whether the Treasury will continue to maintain that certain preferred
shares issued with respect to preferred constitute § 306 stock. See the discussion of
§4, Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL 1232, at 1234, text accompanying note
41 infra. Section 4 of this procedure does not indicate whether the preferred shares
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that a preferred stock dividend will be issued to the holders of pre-
ferred shares.'
Thus, in order to eliminate or penalize the use of all bailout
devices, Congress in 1954 enacted a statutory provision under which
preferred stock issued with respect to common, either as a stock divi-
dend or as part of a corporate reorganization, division or recapitaliza-
tion, might constitute section 306 stock, regardless of the reason for
its issuance.
At the same time, Congress enacted several provisos to section
306, so that not all dispositions of section 306 stock need give rise to
ordinary income. In enacting these provisos, Congress recognized the
fact that the disposition of some preferred stock issued with respect to
common will not result in the bailout of accumulated earnings and
profits. Many of the provisos to be found in section 306 are discussed
in Part III of this article.
B. The Problems Raised by Convertible, Redeemable Preferred Stock
Issued in a Corporate Reorganization
Given the scope and purpose of section 306, where does con-
vertible preferred stock issued in a corporate reorganization fit into the
picture, assuming (as this article will) that such convertible stock is
redeemable at the option of the issuing corporation? In other words,
should convertible preferred stock issued in a corporate reorganization
constitute and be taxed upon disposition as section 306 stock?
It should be noted at the outset that two factors are irrelevant to
the solution of the first portion of this problem: first, the hypothesis
that the convertible shares were issued as part of a corporate reorgani-
zation (as this article earlier indicates, section 306 stock may be,
although need not be, issued as part of a reorganization),° and second,
the principal motive behind the issuance of the shares (motive, accord-
ing to the evident congressional intent, being relevant only upon the
disposition of section 306 shares)." Thus, whether or not convertible
must be issued with respect to common or preferred stock. Apparently this is irrele-
vant, so that the government must now believe that preferred stock issued with respect
to preferred in a corporate reorganization cannot be characterized as § 306 stock.
But see Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d), ex. (2).
2 9 When there are sufficient earnings and profits, a preferred stock dividend may
be issued to the holders of cumulative preferred stock in order to wipe out dividend
arrearages. 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANcIAL PoLIcy OF CoRpo ATioNs 781 (1953).
Section 305(b) (1) of the Code inadequately deals with this problem by providing
that the distribution of a stock dividend will give rise to ordinary income "to the
extent that the distribution is made in discharge of preference dividends for the taz-
able year of the corporation in which the distriltion is mde or for the preceding
taxable year." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 305(b) (1) (emphasis added). When
§ 305(b) (1) does not apply, the dividend shares should probably constitute § 306 stock.
S0 See text accompanying note 17 supra
31 See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
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preferred shares issued as part of a corporate reorganization should be
regarded as section 306 stock depends solely upon whether convertible
preferred stock is to be viewed as common stock or as preferred stock
for purposes of section 306-common stock falling without the scope
of section 306, and preferred stock constituting section 306 stock if
issued with respect to common. The solution to this problem, in turn,
depends upon the bailout potential of convertible preferred.
In order to analyze the problem, let us take a hypothetical situation
in which Corporation X merges into Corporation Y. Assume that
prior to the merger the disappearing corporation (X) had four share-
holders, each of whom owned one-quarter of the corporation's one
hundred-dollar par common stock, the only class of stock issued and
outstanding. Assume, in addition, earnings and profits equal to the
par value of the common stock issued and outstanding. After the
merger, the four shareholders end up with voting common and voting
convertible preferred stock in the surviving corporation (having ten
shareholders in addition to the four) 3 with the same value as the
book value of the common stock surrendered. Further, the convertible
preferred shares of the surviving corporation received by the four
shareholders have the same par value as the book value of the common
shares received, so that each shareholder of the disappearing cor-
poration ends up with one-quarter of the new common and one-quarter
of the new preferred stock issued in exchange for the old common
shares. Finally, each preferred share is convertible into one common
share at a fixed price.
HYPOTHETICAL CASE
HOLDINGS OF SHAREHOLDERS OF DISAPPEARING CORPORATION
PlIOR AND SUBSEQUENT TO MERGER
Share-
holder Prior to Merger After Merger *
Earnings Convertible
Common and Common Preferred
(par) Profits (book) (par)
A 5 units 5 units 5 units 5 units
B 5 units 5 units 5 units 5 units
C 5 units 5 units 5 units 5 units
D 5 units 5 units 5 units 5 units
NOTE: One unit has a fixed value. * It is assumed that there are ten
All units represent voting other shareholders in the surviv-
stock. ing corporation; only A through
D are shown here.
32 It is the author's opinion that in a reorganization context, the § 306 problem
cannot realistically be discussed in terms of an acquired shareholder's position vis-a-vis
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Because each of the four shareholders of the disappearing cor-
poration start out with one-quarter of the common stock of that cor-
poration, and end up with preferred stock plus one-quarter of the
common stock issued to them in the surviving corporation (this
common stock having the same book value as the par value of the
common stock given up), it is arguable that all the conditions necessary
for a bailout exist. Each shareholder arguably may sell his five units
of convertible preferred stock to the surviving corporation or to a third
party without jeopardizing his common equity position' insofar as
his position with respect to his fellow shareholders of the disappearing
corporation is concerned. Thus, the shareholder, in effect, may bail
his interest in the earnings and profits of the disappearing corporation
out of the surviving corporation, to which these earnings were trans-
ferred as a result of merger, provided that the convertible preferred
shares are ultimately redeemed. 4
Whether or not each shareholder in reality may dispose of his
convertible preferred without jeopardizing his common equity position,
however, depends upon what happens to the twenty units of convertible
stock issued to the four shareholders.85 If shareholder A alone converts
his five units, and subsequently the preferred shares of B, C and D are
redeemed, it would appear that the transaction involving issuance of
the preferred shares to B, C and D and their redemption could not be
labeled a bailout. Due to A's conversion and the subsequent redemp-
tion, B, C and D end up with only one-fifth of the common stock in the
surviving corporation held by the former shareholders of the disappear-
ing corporation. Thus, the proceeds of the redemption of B, C and D's
preferred shares, or a portion thereof, should represent compensation
for a reduced equity interest."
This conclusion appears to follow from section 302(b) (2), a '
which deals with substantially disproportionate redemptions. Section
both the shareholders of the acquiring corporation and his fellow acquired shareholders.
The issue, it would seem, is whether, as the result of a reorganization, an acquiring
shareholder has been able to withdraw accumulated earnings and profits of the ac-
quired corporation from the new enterprise, without affecting his common equity
position vis-a-vis his fellow acquired shareholders.
33 The term "common equity position" is used here in the sense of claim upon
earnings and claim upon assets in liquidation.
34 See Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 923-25.
-5 Contra, Darrell, Recent Developments in Nontaxable Reorganizations and
Stock Dividends, 61 HAav. L. REv. 958, 975 (1948).
36 Due to A's conversion, B, C and D each lose five per cent of their interest in
common stock of the surviving corporation held by the former shareholders of the
disappearing corporation. Arguably, then, five per cent of the value of the common
shares should be deducted from each individual's redemption proceeds in order to
determine the extent of the bailout of earnings and profits.
37 Section 302(b) (2) would clearly appear to be relevant for purposes of deter-
mining whether a reduction of equity interest is sufficient to justify the imposition
of a capital gains as opposed to an ordinary income tax. This conclusion is reinforced
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302(b) (2) provides that a capital gains tax will be imposed upon the
redemption of stock, if the percentages of voting and common stock
held by a redeemed shareholder after the redemption are less than
eighty per cent of such percentages prior to the redemption. Taking
the transactions described above as a unit, B, C and D each start out
with one-quarter of the voting and common stock of the surviving
corporation and each end up with one-fifth of the voting and common
stock of the corporation (assuming, for purposes of discussion, that
A, B, C and D are the only shareholders of the surviving enterprise).
This is exactly eighty per cent of their former holdings of common and
voting stock, so that the requirements of section 302(b) (2) have
virtually been met. Thus, an application of section 302 (b) (2) would
appear to support the conclusion that all or a portion of the proceeds
of the redemption of B, C and D's preferred shares should represent
compensation for a reduced equity interest.
A different conclusion would follow, on the basis of section
302(b) (2), if A converted two units of his convertible preferred shares
and thereafter the remaining convertible shares (held by A, B, C and
D) were redeemed. In such a case, B, C and D would each start out
with twenty-five per cent of both the voting and common stock of the
surviving corporation held by the former shareholders of the disappear-
ing corporation, and would each end up with approximately twenty-three,
as opposed to twenty, per cent of this stock-not as substantial a reduc-
tion in equity position. A's equity position, on the other hand, would be
increased. Thus, it would appear that the proceeds of the redemption
of A, B, C and D's preferred shares should represent ordinary income
as opposed to compensation for a reduced equity interest.
Suppose, now, that shareholder A's preferred stock is redeemed
prior to conversion. Whether or not the redemption represents a
bailout of accumulated earnings and profits depends upon what happens
to the convertible shares of B, C and D. If these shares are redeemed,
a bailout will result not only with respect to A, but also with respect
to B, C and D. Here section 302(b) (2) would support what should
be the resulting tax impact, in that redemption results in no change
in the percentage ownership of common and voting stock. If B, C and
D convert their preferred shares,3s however, the reduced equity problem
by the author's opinion that § 306 and § 302 were designed to operate as a unit-§ 306
to close the tax loopholes created by the predecessor of § 302, and § 302 to have certain
independent significance in the bailout field. See the discussion of §§ 306 and 302,
at text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
38 It is worth noting at this point that stock splits, recapitalizations, reductions
in par value and stock dividends, among other things, will dilute a conversion privilege.
4 CAvrrca § 92.01(3), at 1137-38; Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and
Draftsmanship, 19 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1930). Such factors therefore will have
an impact upon a shareholder's decision with respect to conversion.
766 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
raised above with respect to B, C and D is presented again with
respect to A.
If shareholder A sells his preferred stock prior to conversion, more
difficult problems arise. Whether or not a bailout has occurred depends
upon whether or not the shares will be converted by the purchaser, 9
and upon whether or not B, C and D will later convert their shares. If
the shares are converted by the purchaser, A will end up with only a
one-fifth interest in the common stock of the surviving corporation
(assuming that shareholders A, B, C, D and the purchaser are the
only common shareholders). In this case, the proceeds of sale, or a
portion thereof, should represent compensation for a reduced equity
interest, rather than ordinary income." Alternatively, if the shares are
redeemed in the hands of the purchaser, and B, C and D later convert,
leaving A with only a one-seventh interest in the common stock of the
surviving corporation issued to shareholders of the disappearing cor-
poration, the proceeds from the sale of A's preferred shares, or a
portion thereof, should again represent compensation for a reduced
equity interest, rather than ordinary income. This conclusion would
appear to follow from the underlying philosophy of section 302 (b) (2).
The conversion privilege, then, is the factor which makes it
impossible to state conclusively that the issuance of convertible pre-
ferred stock to common shareholders in a corporate reorganization
will in all instances enable the shareholders to bail earnings and profits
of the acquired corporation out of the acquiring corporation without
impairing their common equity position. In some instances, however,
the issuance of convertible preferred stock will give rise to a bailout
of earnings and profits, so that it becomes impossible to categorize all
convertible preferred shares as common stock or as preferred stock for
purposes of section 306. Therefore, all convertible preferred shares
issued in a corporate reorganization should initially be regarded as
section 306 stock.
Whether or not such convertible preferred, section 306 shares
should be taxed upon disposition as section 306 stock must again depend
upon whether or not the disposition of these shares will give rise to a
bailout of earnings and profits. As the discussion above indicates, the
result is uncertain. Only if the holder of convertible preferred shares
exercises his conversion privilege prior to the sale can one assert
conclusively that the disposition of his shares will not result in a
bailout of earnings and profits. And only if all convertible preferred
39 Here, too, it is worth noting that a conversion privilege is transferable, al-
though it must be exercised within the period of time set forth in the instrument
creating the privilege, or within a reasonable time. Hills, supra note 38, at 3, 15-16.
4OSee Harris, The Status of Preferred Stock Bail-Outs, 34 TAXEs 403, 408
(1956).
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shares issued in a corporate reorganization are redeemed in the hands
of, or subsequent to their sale by, the original holder can one assert
conclusively that disposition of the shares has given rise to a bailout
of earnings and profits. Thus, in certain instances, convertible pre-
ferred stock issued in a corporate reorganization should be taxed upon
disposition as section 306 stock, while in other instances it should not.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME: DOES CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK
ISSUED IN A CORPORATE REORGANIZATION CONSTITUTE
SECTION 306 STOCK?
Special section 306 problems, then, are created by convertible
preferred stock issued in a corporate reorganization. The Code and
regulations have resolved these peculiar section 306 problems by
ignoring them. Section 306(c) (1) (B), defining section 306 stock
issued in a reorganization, and the accompanying regulations fail to
indicate whether or not convertible preferred shares issued in a re-
organization are to be treated as ordinary preferred or as common
stock for purposes of section 306, although section 306(e) (1) implies
the former. And until quite recently, the Commissioner had issued
neither a public ruling nor a revenue procedure dealing specifically with
such convertible preferred shares.
A. Section 4 of Revenue Procedure 66-34
Revenue Procedure 66-34 ' is the only published revenue pro-
cedure which deals with convertible preferred stock. Section 4 of the
procedure provides that a ruling usually will be issued to the effect
that, in a corporate reorganization, convertible preferred stock issued
to shareholders who receive no common shares will not be regarded as
section 306 stock, provided that the convertible stock is widely held
or provided that there will be no conversion pursuant to a plan enabling
shareholders ultimately to hold both common and preferred shares.
The procedure goes no further.
The procedure does indicate, however, that the Treasury will not
expressly treat all convertible preferred stock issued in a corporate
reorganization as common stock for purposes of section 306. This
decision is consistent not only with statutory purpose, but also with
prior rulings and case law. Although the Treasury might have con-
cluded that convertible preferred stock issued in a reorganization falls
within the common stock exception to section 306, such a conclusion
could not have withstood attack under such prior authority.
411966-2 Cum,. BulL. 1232, 1234.
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Three alternative approaches were open to the Treasury, each
of which is worth exploring.
The Treasury might first have concluded that convertible pre-
ferred stock falls within the corporate definition of common stock and
therefore must be regarded as common stock for purposes of section
306. This conclusion is based upon two premises: (1) that the mean-
ing of the term "common stock," as used in section 306, must be
found in corporate law; and (2) that under corporate law, convertible
preferred stock does indeed constitute common stock. The first
premise is in fact defensible. Because section 306 does not define the
term "common stock," and because the Senate Report does not shed
any light upon the matter,42 it is arguable that Congress felt that
corporate law would supply the missing definition." The second
premise, however, is clearly indefensible. Although the definitions of
common stock under corporate law are diverse," a frequently quoted
definition 45 provides that common stock is stock enabling the holder
"to make profit if there is any, and participate in the assets after all
other claims are paid, and bear the loss if there be such." 46 This
definition clearly has no application to convertible preferred shares
prior to their conversion. Thus, the second premise is invalid and the
first alternative approach was properly rejected by the Treasury.
Assuming that the meaning of the term "preferred stock" must
be found in corporate law, however, the Treasury might secondly have
concluded that convertible preferred does not fall within the corporate
definition of preferred stock and thus must be regarded as common
stock for the purposes of section 306. There is some support for the
argument that convertible preferred stock issued in a corporate re-
organization does not constitute preferred stock as the term is used
in corporate law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 47 has
indicated that preferred stock "differs . . . from other stocks in that
it is given preference and has no voting rights." 48 Because con-
42 See Kanter, Preferred Stock in "B" Reorganization 90 n.6.
4 3 Kanter assumes that case law must supply the statutory definition of common
stock. Presumably he means corporate case law. Id. Alexander and Landis, however,
suggest that statutory purpose should be considered in determining the definition of
common stock for purposes of § 306. Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 918-19. In
reality, Congress probably intended that both corporate law and statutory purpose
should supply the missing definition.
44Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 918.
45 The definition is found in General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N.J.
Eq. 234, 100 A. 347 (1917), cited in 11 W. FLrCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5086,
at 55 n.35 (perm. ed. rev. 1958).
46 87 N.J. Eq. at 242, 100 A. at 351.
47 Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1931).
4 8 1d. at 596. See Rev. Rul. 57-132, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 115, where common
stock which had no voting rights and which was redeemable at the discretion of the
corporation was found to be § 306 stock.
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vertible preferred stock issued in a corporate reorganization generally
will carry voting rights, it would follow from the Ninth Circuit's state-
ment that such stock could not be characterized as preferred stock
under corporate law. Thus, under this second approach, the Treasury
might have concluded that such stock must be regarded as common
stock for purposes of section 306. The approach, however, is unsound.
Its first major weakness lies in the fact that, contrary to the statement
of the Ninth Circuit, recently-issued, ordinary preferred shares often
carry voting rights.4" A second major weakness lies in the probable
invalidity of the premise that stock which does not fall within the
corporate definition of preferred stock must be regarded as common
stock for purposes of section 306. Thus, the second alternative ap-
proach was also properly rejected.
There remains a third approach: that for purposes of section 306,
convertible preferred stock must be regarded as common stock due
solely to the conversion privilege. There is some authority for focusing
upon what shares may ultimately become. Section 306(e) (2) pro-
vides that "common stock with respect to which there is a privilege
of converting into stock other than common stock . . . shall not be
treated as common stock." Further, an old Treasury memorandum 5 0
holds that rights enabling shareholders to subscribe to bonds which are
convertible into stock are to be considered substantially the same as
stock rights.
Neither section 306(e) (2) nor the Treasury memorandum, how-
ever, conclusively indicates that the tax law enables one to focus upon
what shares may ultimately become for purposes of applying the pro-
visions of the Code. It is difficult to draw such an inference from
section 306(e) (2), which was enacted in order to close a potential
loophole-the issuance of convertible common shares."' Further, with
respect to the Treasury memorandum, Tax Maiwgement states that
the Service has doubts about the position taken in the memorandum,'2
while a relatively recent ruling 53 suggests the present unsoundness of
the memorandum, concluding that convertible certificates received in
a statutory merger may not be treated as stock for purposes of section
49 See Harris, supra note 40, at 406-07. Preferred shares listed on the New York
Stock Exchange must carry certain voting rights, NYSE COMPANY MANuAL A-15,
and under many state corporation laws, preferred shares must carry voting rights
unless the corporate charter otherwise provides. 4 CAvrrcH § 88.03(2) (d) (i), at
841-44.
50 G.C.M. 13275, XIII-2 Cum. Buu.. 121 (1934).
S1 Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 919.
52See SECTION 306 STOCK, TAX MAAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 85, at 33 (1963).
53 Rev. Rul. 57-586, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 249. The certificates were convertible
into common stock.
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356."4 Thus the third alternative approach as well was properly
rejected by the Treasury.
The approach actually taken in Revenue Procedure 66-34 in-
dicates that the Treasury will not expressly treat all convertible pre-
ferred as common stock for purposes of section 306. Indeed, the
Revenue Procedure goes further, suggesting that the Treasury will
generally consider convertible preferred shares as ordinary preferred
for purposes of ascertaining their section 306 character.55 This con-
clusion follows from the fact that in the two non-section 306 stock
reorganization situations described in Revenue Procedure 66-34, ordi-
nary preferred stock probably would not have been categorized by the
Treasury as section 306 stock under the rules developed by the govern-
ment for ascertaining the presence or absence of section 306 shares.
The first of the two non-section 306 situations described in
Revenue Procedure 66-34 involved the issuance in a reorganization
of convertible preferred stock to shareholders who received no common
shares, it being "represented that there [would] not be any conversion
of the convertible preferred stock pursuant to a concerted plan which
[would] result in both preferred and common stock being held by an
exchanging shareholder." 5' The conversion proviso in the first
situation suggests that the convertible shares were being likened to
ordinary preferred, which could clearly not have been characterized as
section 306 stock under the government's so-called cash substitution
test.57
The second non-section 306 situation described in Revenue Pro-
cedure 66-34 involved the issuance, as part of a corporate reorganiza-
tion, of convertible preferred stock to shareholders receiving no common
shares, the convertible stock being "widely-held." As this article later
indicates, 58 ordinary preferred shares which are widely held under
many circumstances will not be regarded as section 306 stock. And
thus, the second situation further suggests that convertible preferred
shares will be likened by the government to ordinary preferred in order
to ascertain their section 306 character. 59
54 INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 356.
55 In the past, the Treasury has treated convertible preferred as ordinary pre-
ferred stock in order to ascertain its § 306 character. In a private ruling cited in a
1963 law review note, the Treasury held that convertible preferred stock issued in a
corporate reorganization constituted § 306 stock, but there was apparently no recogni-
tion of the fact that convertible preferred stock constitutes a commodity distinct from
regular preferred. Letter from Harold T. Swartz, Assistant Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service to C. Rudolph Peterson, August 23, 1961, cited in Note,
Exclsion from Section 306 Treatment in Unifying Reorganizations, 76 HA.v. L. REV.
1627 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusion from Section 306 Treatment].
56 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 1232, 1234.
57 The cash substitution test is discussed at text accompanying notes 62-90 infra.
5 8 See the discussion at text accompanying notes 91-105 infra.
59 At least one author suggests, particularly on the basis of § 306(e) (1), that,
under current law, convertible preferred stock must be regarded as ordinary preferred
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B. Ordinary Preferred as Section 306 Stock: The Government's
Pure Cash Substitution Test
Thus, Revenue Procedure 66-34 implies that convertible preferred
stock issued in a corporate reorganization will constitute section 306
stock only if ordinary preferred would be regarded as section 306
stock under the given circumstances. It therefore becomes necessary
to consider the criteria which have been developed for ascertaining
whether or not ordinary preferred stock issued in a given corporate
reorganization constitutes section 306 stock.
Section 306(c) (1) (B) defines section 306 stock as:
Stock which is not common stock and (i) which was re-
ceived . . . in pursuance of a plan of reorganization . .
and (ii) with respect to the receipt of which gain or loss to
the shareholder was to any extent not recognized by reason
of [the reorganization provisions], but only to the extent
that . . . the effect of the transaction was substantially the
same as the receipt of a stock dividend . . . 0
The primary problem raised by section 306(c) (1) (B) concerns
the meaning of the qualifying phrase, "the effect of the transaction was
substantially the same as the receipt of a stock dividend." " In an
effort to clarify the phrase, section 1.306-3 (d) of the regulations pro-
vides that:
Ordinarily, section 306 stock includes stock which is not
common stock received in pursuance of a plan of reorganiza-
tion (within the meaning of section 368(a)) . . . if cash
received in lieu of such stock would have been treated as a
dividend under section 356(a) (2) or would have been treated
as a distribution to which section 301 applies by virtue of
. . . section 302(d).'
This regulation, popularly known as the cash substitution test,
apparently is a simple solution to the problem raised by the qualifying
phrase of section 306(c) (1) (B). Indeed, it would be simple (if not
for purposes of § 306. Harris, supra note 40, at 408. Basing the the suggestion on
§ 306(e)(1) may not be sound. Section 306(e)(1) indicates that convertible pre-
ferred shares may constitute § 306 stock, but from this it does not follow that
§ 306(e) (1) assumes that convertible preferred shares must be regarded as ordinary
preferred for purposes of ascertaining their § 306 character.
60 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(c) (1) (B).
61Id. § 306(c) (1) (B) (ii). It is interesting to note that prior to enactment of
the 1954 Code, one author made the following comment: "Upon the basis of the
[stock dividend cases] it is submitted with confidence that, in the law of taxation, the
phrase 'stock dividend' denotes the issuance of a more or less permanent equity
security; and that short-term redeemable preferred stock does not meet that require-
ment" Dauber, Preferred Stock Dividends: Permanency of Interest and the Federal
Iixome Tax Law, 8 RUTGERS L. REv. 472, 480-81 (1954) (footnote omitted).
62The words omitted before the phrase "section 302(d)" are "section 356(b) or."
The section references in the quoted passage are to sections of INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954.
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logical), were it not for the fact that the test permits the government
to apply the provisions of either section 356(a) (2) or section 302(d)
to hypothetical cash in order to determine the presence or absence of
section 306 shares.
As a practical matter, the choice of one of these sections over the
other should be irrelevant.6 Section 356(a) (2) provides that if an
exchange of stock or securities has the "effect of the distribution of a
dividend, then there shall be treated as a dividend" all or a portion of
the gain realized by the exchanging shareholder or security holder.
Section 302(d) provides that if a corporation redeems its stock, gain
or loss will be ordinary, unless certain exceptions set forth in section
302(b) apply, the first exception being that "the redemption is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend." The section 356(a) (2) concept
of dividend effect should, it would appear, be equated with the section
302 concept of dividend equivalance.' But these concepts have not
always been equated in the past,6 5 and thus the choice between section
356(a)(2) and section 302(d) becomes significant insofar as the
application of the cash substitution test is concerned.
In applying the cash substitution test, the government apparently
has chosen section 356(a) (2),36 except in situations in which reliance
63This despite the fact that the dividend equivalence test set forth in § 306(c)
(1) (B) (ii) is essentially the old dividend equivalence test of § 115(g) of the 1939
Code, now § 302(b) (1). See Dean, Riles Governing Preferred Stock Bail-Olits,
N.Y.U. 14r IxsT. oN Fa. TAX. 691, 703 (1956).
4The Court of Claims feels that the two concepts should be interpreted in the
same manner. See Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807,
809 (Ct. Cl. 1958).6 5 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
66 The government has clearly applied the cash substitution test in only one
revenue ruling, Rev. Rul. 56-586, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 214, in which reference was
significantly made to § 356(a) (2) of the Code. Revenue Ruling 56-586 involved an"E" reorganization, i.e., a recapitalization. INT. R.y. CoDE oF 1954, § 386(a) (1) (E).
Prior to the recapitalization, two brothers, C and D, owned all the common stock of
the corporation, while the preferred was scattered among C, D, their families, a third
brother, his family and the general public. For valid business reasons, the preferred
shares held for everyone save C and D and their immediate families were redeemed.
C, D and their wives and children received in exchange for their old preferred stock
either new Class A or Class B preferred. The Service, after finding an "E" reor-
ganization, stated that "the new preferred stock will be treated as 'section 306 stock'
...to the extent that cash, if received in lien of such stock, would have been treated
as a distribution to which section 301 of the Code applies by reason of the provisions
of section 356(a) (2) . . . ." Rev. Rul. 56-583, 1956-2 Cum. Bunr. at 215. No
further conclusions were drawn. But only the preferred stock held by C and D
logically could have been found to constitute § 306 stock. Taking into account C's
and D's common stock holdings, the substitution of cash as to them would not have
resulted in a complete redemption and, further, their new preferred shares were
arguably issued with respect to common. See the commentary upon Revenue Ruling
56-586 found in Trimble, Treatment of Preferred Stock Distributions 362-64; Note,
Exclusion from Section 306 Treatment 1638.
The cash substitution test was also applied in Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 Cum.
BuLL. 77, but a split-off was involved, and in accordance with the regulations, refer-
ence was made to § 356(b), rather than to § 356(a) (2) of the Code.
Consider also Rev. Rul. 56-116, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 164, and Rev. Rul. 66-332,
1966-2 Cum. BULL. 108.
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upon section 356 (a) (2) might not produce the desired results.6" Be-
cause of the structure of, and the law which has evolved under, section
356(a) (2), reference to section 356(a)(2) rather than to section
302 of the Code creates numerous problems which should be irrelevant
to the determination whether the effect of a transaction is substantially
the same as the receipt of a stock dividend,6" which is the question
posed by 306(c) (1) (B).
The first problem created by reference to section 356(a) (2) rather
than section 302 of the Code concerns the dividend equivalence test to
be applied under section 356 (a) (2). At least one court would apply
a "net effect" test,69 under which an exchange will be said to have the
effect of the distribution of a dividend if, as a result, a shareholder
retains an identical equity interest in the enterprise and at the same
time receives disposable "boot." 71 In a section 306 reorganization
context, the net effect approach will produce section 306 stock (assum-
ing that the acquired corporation has undistributed earnings and profits
prior to the reorganization) 7 if a shareholder of the acquired cor-
poration receives stock in the acquiring corporation which can be dis-
posed of without affecting his pre-reorganization equity position.
67 Alexander and Landis suggest that the government will rely upon § 302 when
there is a loss, § 356 (a) (2) then being inapplicable. Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs
933. See note 89 infra. Trimble suggests that reference will be made to § 302(d)
when the substitution of cash results in a complete redemption. Trimble, Treatment
of Preferred Stock Distributions 363. Consider, however, Rev. Rul. 59-84, 1959-1
Cum. BuLL. 71, where the government conceivably may have applied a § 302(b) (1)
oriented test of dividend equivalence when there was no need to rely upon § 302 in
order to find § 306 stock. In finding § 306 stock, the government stated that after
the transaction the shareholders who received preferred owned "a percentage interest
in the common stock equity which [was] greater or not substantially less than his
percentage interest in such equity before the transaction." Rev. Rul. 59-84, 1959-1
Cum. BuirL. at 71.
68 In view of these numerous problems, it is difficult to imagine why an advisory
group on subchapter C endorsed the formulation set forth in the regulations. See
Advisory Group on Subchapter C, Revised Report on Corporate Distribution anid
Adjustments, in Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations Before the Sub-
comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation of the Hmise Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1959).
69 The Court of Claims in Idaho Power v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807, 809
(Ct Cl. 1958), indicated that it would apply a "net effect" test under § 356 (a) (2).
A net effect test was also applied in Rev. Rul. 59-84, 1959-1 Cum. Bur. 71. But
query whether the test was applied after reference to § 356(a) (2), as opposed to
§ 302(b) (1).
70 "Boot' is used here in the sense of money and other property which is
taxable in an otherwise tax free transaction. See INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, §§ 354,
356(a) (1) (B).
7 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(a) provides that:
Any class of stock distributed to a shareholder in a transaction in which no
amount is includible in the income of the shareholder or no gain or loss is
recognized may be section 306 stock, provided the distributing corporation
has earnings and profits at the time of distribution and for this purpose the
total amount of the earnings and profits is immaterial.
See Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 932 n.64; Kanter, Preferred Stocks in "B" Re-
organization 92-93 n.13; Stinson, Some Subchapter C Trouble Spots-After Two
Years, 34 TAxEs 890, 904 (1956).
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A second test of dividend equivalence, however, has evolved under
section 356(a) (2). This is the Bedford ' doctrine under which boot
automatically will be treated as a cash dividend to the extent of
accumulated earnings and profits. In a section 306 context, Bedford
would suggest that all preferred stock issued with respect to common
as part of a corporate reorganization must constitute section 306 stock
if the acquired corporation has undistributed earnings and profits equal
in value to or greater than the value of the newly issued preferred shares.
Whether the government will apply this automatic dividend rule
rather than a net effect test in determining the presence or absence
of section 306 stock, however, remains unclear. Within the last twelve
years, the government has applied the Bedford doctrine in a section
356(a) (2) context." Thus it could conceivably apply the doctrine
today in determining whether or not preferred shares issued in a
corporate reorganization constitute section 306 stock. 4 The one
ruling in which the cash substitution test was clearly applied " sheds
no light upon the matter.
The second problem which has evolved from reference to section
356(a) (2) rather than section 302 of the Code concerns the disquali-
fication of the underlying reorganization as a tax-free exchange. Al-
though the argument is hyper-tecimical, some authors have asserted
that if the distribution of cash in lieu of preferred stock would have
taken the reorganization out of the category of tax-free exchanges, the
substitution of hypothetical cash for the preferred stock actually dis-
tributed should render application of section 356(a) (2) inapposite due
to the fact that section 356 comes into play only if boot is received in an
otherwise tax-free reorganization.7 The problem is most acute in
"B" 7 and "C" 7' reorganizations where a corporation must be acquired
solely or almost exclusively for voting stock. But a problem does
potentially exist with respect to "A" reorganizations.
" Commissioner v. Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945).7VRev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 Cum. Buu.m 191. The Bedford doctrine may have
been applied in Rev. Rul. 57-586, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 249. See Kanter, Preferred Stock
in "B" Reorganization 96 n.23. It is interesting to note that the government, in its
brief in Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl. 1958), took
the position that dividend equivalence could be treated as a question of ultimate fact.
Brief for Defendant at 31, Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct.
Cl. 1958).
7
4
See Kanter, Preferred Stock in "B" Reorganizatimo 96. Query whether the
Bedford doctrine could be applied, however, given Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(a) quoted in
note 71 supra. The regulation provides that "the total amount of the earnings and
profits is immaterial."
75 Rev. Rul. 56-586, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 214.
76 See Trimble, Treatment of Preferred Stock Distributions 376 n.108.
77 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368,(a) (1) (B) ; see Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs
935; Kanter, Preferred Stock in "B" Reorganization 91-92.
78 The problem which arises in connection with "C" reorganizations, INT. RxLv.
CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C), is discussed in Note, Exclusion from Section 306
Treatment 1630.
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An "A" reorganization is defined in section 368(a) (1) as a
statutory merger or consolidation. No details are mentioned, and
thus any merger or consolidation which is valid under state law
arguably should qualify as a tax-free exchange, regardless of the
amount of voting or non-voting stock distributed to shareholders of
the disappearing corporation. But there may be a "continuity of in-
terest" requirement with respect to statutory mergers or consolidations.
The "continuity of interest" test was first mentioned and applied
by the Supreme Court in Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Com-
missioner,79 decided under the Revenue Act of 1926. The test was
incorporated in the 1934 definitions of "B" and "C" reorganizations. 0
But an "A" reorganization was defined only briefly under the Revenue
Act of 1934 as a statutory merger or consolidation."' However, in
Roebling v. Commissioner 2 (decided under the Revenue Act of 1938),
the Third Circuit determined that a continuity of interest test should
be applied to "A" reorganizations. Thus, if a sufficient proprietary
interest were not retained by shareholders of the disappearing cor-
poration, the reorganization could not qualify as a tax-free exchange.
In later cases arising under the 1939 Code, the Roebling decision
was accepted as precedent. 3 There is some doubt, however, whether
Roebling is still effective, because boot received in an otherwise
tax-free exchange will now be taxable under section 356." But the
existence or non-existence of a tax-free reorganization will have an
effect upon the basis of assets received by the transferee corporation
and may affect the type of income received by the transferor share-
holders-ordinary income or capital gain.85
Thus, the substitution of hypothetical cash for preferred stock
received by shareholders of the disappearing corporation could dis-
qualify an "A" reorganization as a tax-free exchange. One is there-
fore compelled, even for statutory mergers or consolidations, to
determine whether the government's cash substitution test is rendered
inoperative when the underlying exchange cannot qualify as a tax-free
transaction once the receipt of cash rather than stock is posited.
79 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
80 Revenue Act of 1934, cl. 277, § 112(g) (1) (B) and (C), 48 Stat. 705.
81 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g) (1) (A), 48 Stat 705.
82 143 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 773 (1944).
83W. H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433 (1957), acquiesced in, 1960-2 Cum. BuL. 7;
Southwest Natural Gas Co., 14 T.C. 81 (1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
8 4 See S. SuRmPy & W. WAaaEN, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION, CASES AND MA-
TERIALs 1554-55 (1960); Maxwell, Continuity of Interest it Recapitalizations and
Mergers, 40 TAXES 1003, 1012 (1962). Under the law as it stood at the time of the
Roebling decision (and prior to 1954), boot received in a tax free reorganization was
non-taxable, so that the government was required to establish the existence of a non-
tax free exchange in order to tax the boot. See note 70 supra.
85S*. SuREy & W. WARR, supra note 84, at 1554-55.
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The final problem created by reference to section 356 (a) (2) rather
than section 302 of the Code concerns the dividend-within-gain rule
of section 356 (a) (2). Once it is established that preferred stock issued
in a corporate reorganization has the effect of the distribution of a
dividend, and once the problem of the disqualification of the re-
organization has been overcome, it becomes necessary to determine
whether or not the preferred stock is to be treated as section 306 stock
only to the extent of realized gain, as section 356(a) (2) would
suggest.8
The government has never set forth its position,87 but it gen-
erally is believed that the dividend-within-gain limitation of section
356 (a) (2) will not be adhered to when reference is made to section
356(a) (2) under the cash substitution test.8" Once the existence of
gain is established,' all preferred shares issued with respect to common
should be regarded as section 306 stock, provided the other criteria of a
section 356-oriented cash substitution test can be met. The fact that
the actual receipt of cash (in an "A" or "C" reorganization) causes
some or even all of the gain 90 to be recognized should be irrelevant.
C. Ordinary Preferred as Section 306 Stock: The Government's
Modified Cash Substitution Test
Despite the problems created by a cash substitution test based
primarily upon section 356 of the Code, there is no indication that the
test will be abandoned for a cash substitution test based solely upon
section 302. But the government appears to have developed a modified
section 356-oriented cash substitution test which takes into account
86See Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 932; Trimble, Treatment of Preferred
Stock Distributions 356; cf. Note, Excltsion from Section 306 Treatment 1634-36.
87 See the discussion of the only ruling which relies upon a § 356(a) (2) -oriented
cash substitution test at note 66 supra.
88 Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 932; Kanter, Preferred Stock in "B" Reor-
ganization 92 n.13, 96 n.21; Stinson, spra note 71, at 904.
89 Section 356 (a) (2) clearly requires the existence of some realized gain. Thus,
if there is a loss, § 306 stock cannot be found if reference is made solely to § 356(a) (2).
One commentator feels that preferred stock received in a loss transaction should not
constitute § 306 stock, due partly to the fact that § 306(c) (2) states that "the term
'section 306 stock' does not include any stock no part of the distribution of which
would have been a dividend at the time of the distribution if money had been dis-
tributed in lieu of the stock." Section 306(c) (2) indicates that § 306 stock cannot
exist absent undistributed earnings and profits. Diamond, A View of Section 306 or
"Taint" Necessarily So, 17 Bus. LAw 256, 260 (1962). Two other commentators,
however, feel that preferred stock issued in a loss transaction may constitute § 306
stock under the government's interpretation of the statute. They realize that a loss
transaction cannot give rise to § 306 stock if a cash substitution test based solely upon
§ 356 (a) (2) is applied. Thus it is suggested that § 302 may be applied under the
formulation set forth in the regulations. Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 932-33.
10 Section 306(c) (1) (B) (ii) indicates that § 306 stock constitutes, among other
things, stock with respect to the receipt of which gain was to any extent not recog-
nized under §§ 354-68. The provision can be read narrowly to mean that there must be
some non-recognition of gain, so that if shareholders of the acquired or disappearing
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the nature of the acquiring corporation and the extent of ownership
of its newly issued preferred shares.9 An analysis of certain published
revenue rulings suggests the following two-part rule of thumb:
1. If the acquiring corporation is publicly held and if the
preferred shares issued with respect to common are widely
held, the shares will not constitute section 306 stock if, shortly
after issuance, they are neither redeemed nor sold in antici-
pation of redemption.
2. If the acquiring corporation is small and closely held,
preferred stock issued with respect to common in the re-
organization will constitute section 306 stock if the criteria of
the cash substitution test can be met.
Actually, in only one published revenue ruling 92 has the govern-
ment held that ordinary preferred shares issued with respect to common
in a corporate reorganization (a statutory merger) could not be
regarded as section 306 stock, due to the publicly held nature of the
surviving corporation and the fact that the preferred shares were
widely held. 3 There was no indication in the ruling, however, that
the shares would have been regarded as section 306 stock had re-
demption or sale in anticipation of redemption been contemplated.
An earlier ruling 94 suggests these qualifications. Revenue Ruling
56-116 involved a proposed statutory merger under which both pre-
ferred and common shares of Corporation X were to be exchanged
corporation receive cash equal to the realized gain, there may be no § 306 stock.
Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 928; McClure & Reuben, The Preferred Stock Bail-
Out: Section 306 of the '54 Code, 2 P-H TAx IDEAS fIlt 25,001, 25,001.1(3).
But the provision can also be read expansively to mean that there must be some
unrecognized gain on the stock-for-preferred-stock exchange involved in the corporate
reorganization, but that any cash, which will be treated as boot and taxed at ordinary
rates, may wipe out the unrecognized gain on the stock-for-stock exchange without
ruling out the existence of § 306 stock.
Note that this discussion is also relevant to a § 302-oriented cash substitution test.
91 It is interesting to note that the government may have adopted a view ex-
pressed by the Tax Court in C. P. Chamberlin, 18 T.C. 164 (1952). The court states:
It is our opinion that the issue presented of whether the stock dividend of
preferred on common constituted income to the stockholders . . . must be
determined from a consideration of all the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the issuance of such dividend and not by a consideration limited to the
characteristics of the stock declared as a dividend.
Id. at 172.
92 Rev. Rul. 60-1, 1960-1 Cum. Bur.. 143. This ruling involved a recapitalization
which was carried out in conjunction with a merger. Trimble criticizes the govern-
ment's approach to the problem as to whether or not the redeemable preferred stock
issued by the surviving corporation to its own shareholders constituted § 306 stock.
He feels that the factors relied upon by the government in resolving the problem were
relevant only to ascertaining the presence of a plan to avoid taxes. Trimble, Treat-
rent of Preferred Stock Distributions 379; cf. Kanter, Preferred Stock in "B" Re-
organization 99 n.26.
93 With respect to the second point, the Ruling states: "The new preferred stock
is not largely owned by the management . . . . There is no single dominant group
in the survivor corporation." Rev. Rul. 60-1, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 143, 144.
94 Rev. Rul. 56-116, 1956-1 Cum. BuLm. 164.
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for common stock of Corporation Y, the corporation to be acquired.
The common stock of both X and Y was widely held, so that pre-
sumably the newly issued preferred shares would be widely held.95
Although the government held that the newly issued preferred shares
would be regarded as section 306 stock, the government went on to
state that sale of the shares to a third party would result in ordinary
income " only if the sale were in anticipation of redemption.97  Thus,
although the government was asked only to consider whether or not
the proposed preferred shares would be regarded as section 306 stock,
the government voluntarily went on to indicate that the preferred
shares, even though section 306 stock, would not be taxable at ordinary
rates upon a particular form of disposition which apparently had not
been presented to the government as a probability at the time that the
ruling was issued. Thus, in Revenue Ruling 56-116, the government
must have actually held that the preferred shares to be issued in the
proposed corporate reorganization would not constitute section 306
stock, if shortly after issuance, they were neither redeemed nor sold
in anticipation of redemption.9
Revenue Ruling 56-116, and the later ruling discussed above,
therefore suggest part one of the suggested two-part rule of thumb,9
05 The conclusion that the newly issued preferred shares would be widely held
is based upon the assumption that the preferred shares would be issued to common
shareholders of the acquired corporation on a pro-rata basis.
SO Section 306(a) (1) provides that if the disposition of § 306 stock is not a
redemption, the entire amount realized will be treated as gain from the sale of property
which is not a capital asset, provided that such amount realized equals or exceeds
the stock's ratable share of earnings and profits of the acquired corporation at the
time of the initial issuance of the stock. No loss will be recognized in the case of a
disposition which is not a redemption.
97 Section 306(a) (2) provides that if the disposition of § 306 stock is a redemp-
tion, the amount realized will be treated as a distribution of property to which § 301
applies. Thus, the amount realized will be taxable as a dividend if the redeeming
corporation, at the time of the redemption, has accumulated earnings and profits equal
to or greater than the realized amount Whatever amount is not taxable as a dividend
will be applied in reduction of basis; the remainder will constitute capital gain.
98 The government's willingness to deal with the distribution and sale of § 306
shares prior to their issuance and to deal with redemptions of § 306 shares at the time
of their occurrence has been referred to as a "two bite" approach. Chapman, Rulings
point to exemption of 306 stock in public companies as IRS policy, 7 J. TAXATxON
221, 223 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Chapman, Exemption of 306 Stock]. A two
bite approach may have been applied in Rev. Rul. 57-103, 1957-1 Cum. Buu. 113,
involving a "C" reorganization. In holding that an ordinary income tax would not
be imposed upon the sale or other disposition (other than a redemption) of what
was found to be § 306 stock, the Service cited Rev. Rul. 56-116, 1956-1 Cum. BULL.
164 (dealing with a proposed transaction). The facts, as set forth in Revenue Ruling
57-103, however, suggest that the "C" reorganization had been completed and a
disposition of preferred shares planned at the time the Ruling was issued. Consider,
however, a private ruling issued in 1963, prior to completion of a proposed "B"
reorganization. A two bite approach was taken, but query whether the corporations
involved were closely or publicly held. The ruling is cited in Berger & Kanter,
Shop Talk, 18 J. TAxATioN 252 (1963).
19 The publicly held nature of the issuing corporation is suggested by the later
ruling, the widely held nature of certain non-section 306 preferred shares is suggested
by both the later ruling and Revenue Ruling 56-116, and the final proviso that non-
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while Revenue Ruling 59-84,1°° and the obvious implications of part
one of the suggested rule of thumb, suggest part two. Revenue Ruling
59-84 provides that preferred shares issued with respect to common
by a closely held corporation will constitute section 306 stock if, after
the transaction, the shareholders who receive preferred stock own a
percentage interest in the common equity of the corporation which is
greater than or not substantially less than their percentage interest prior
to the transaction. Revenue Ruling 59-84, therefore, suggests that the
shareholders of a closely held corporation initially must establish lack
of equivalence to a dividend under the cash substitution test in order
to avert the characterization of their preferred shares as section 306
stock.
The rule of thumb thus emerges from the three rulings discussed
above, but the underlying reason for the rule is more difficult to
ascertain. Certainly it is not true that widely held preferred shares
issued by a publicly held corporation will not enable the holder to
bail earnings and profits out of the enterprise without dilution of his
existing equity position. I have concluded that it is the government's
belief that section 306(b) (4) and the definitional provisions of section
306 of the Code must be read as a whole, so that the motive behind the
issuance and/or disposition of preferred shares becomes relevant for
purposes of determining their section 306 character. Section 306 (b) (4)
provides that the disposition of section 306 stock will not give rise to
an ordinary income tax if a primary purpose behind the issuance
and/or disposition of the stock was not the desire to avoid federal
income taxes. Thus, preferred shares whose issuance and/or dis-
position were not prompted primarily by a desire to avoid federal
income taxes could not be regarded as section 306 stock under the
government's motive-oriented approach to the definition of section 306
stock. The fact that preferred shares are widely held, the fact that
the issuing corporation is publicly rather than closely held and the
fact that the shares will neither be redeemed nor sold in anticipation
of redemption shortly after issuance, all suggest that avoidance of tax
was not the motive for the issuance (and disposition) of the shares.
Hence the suggested two-part rule of thumb follows.'
section 306 shares must, shortly after issuance, neither be redeemed nor sold in antici-
pation of redemption, is taken from Revenue Ruling 56-116, where the government
in effect found non-section 306 stock, provided that the preferred shares in question
would be sold only to a third party, other than in anticipation of redemption.
100 1959-1 Cum. BumL. 71. Consider also Rev. Rul. 66-332, 1966-2 Cum. BULL.
108, which may have involved a closely held corporation.
10 1 See DeWind, Preferred Stock "Bail-Outs" and the Income Tax, 62 IHAv.
L. REv. 1126, 1140 (1949); Kanter, Preferred Stock in "B" Reorganization 98-99.
The relevance of motive under tax law is discussed in Brown, An Approach to Sub-
chapter C, 3 TAx RtLsIoN Co~MPzNDum 1619, 1620 (1959).
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Given this reason for the rule, further support for its existence
can be found in a number of published revenue procedures (some of
which have been superseded), dealing with whether a shareholder can
avoid an ordinary income tax upon the disposition of his section 306
shares by reason of the exception set forth in section 306(b) (4).
Revenue Procedure 64-3 1,102 published in 1964 and since expanded,
provided that advance rulings would not be issued as to whether or
not the distribution or disposition of section 306 stock in a closely held
corporation was in pursuance of a plan having tax avoidance as one
of its principal purposes. The phrase "in a closely-held corporation"
was new to Revenue Procedure 64-31, for two years earlier Revenue
Procedure 62-32 10 merely indicated that no advance rulings would be
issued on the matter of tax avoidance. The addition of the phrase
"closely-held corporation" suggested a willingness on the part of the
government to issue rulings prior to a reorganization, which, in effect,
indicated the non-section 306 character of certain widely held preferred
shares to be issued by a publicly held corporation. The addition of this
phrase further suggested the government's belief that preferred stock
issued by a closely held corporation would constitute section 306 stock
if the requirements of the cash substitution test could be met.
Section 5 of Revenue Procedure 66-34,"°' amplifying Revenue
Procedure 64-31, further indicates the existence of the government's
two-part rule of thumb suggested above. Revenue Procedure 66-34
provides that a ruling usually will be issued under section 306(b) (4)
if (a) the stock (presumably section 306 stock) of the issuing cor-
poration is widely held and either (b) the section 306 stock is not re-
deemable for at least five years from date of issuance and the taxpayer
represents that there will be no redemption of the stock within the
five-year period or (c) disposition of the stock is not by way of
redemption or by way of sale in anticipation of redemption. °5 Cer-
tainly this procedure suggests that the government will issue pre-
reorganization rulings which, in effect, indicate the non-section 306
status of widely held preferred shares (probably issued by a publicly
held corporation), regardless of the existence or non-existence of
dividend equivalence, provided that the shares, shortly after issuance,
are neither redeemed nor sold in anticipation of redemption.
102 1964-2 Cum. Bu.-. 947, 950-51.
103 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 527, 532, superseding Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL.
880, 884. The provisions of both Procedures were identical.
104 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 1232, 1234.
105 With respect to this latter alternative, the Procedure actually provides as
follows:
A ruling will usually be issued under section 306(b) (4) of the Code to
the effect that a distribution of "section 306 stock" (other than a distribution
under section 305 of the Code) and the disposition of the "section 306 stock",
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The various limitations in the procedure support this conclusion
insofar as it relates to the conditions under which favorable section
306(b) (4) rulings will be issued. But the conclusion as to the
government's willingness to issue pre-reorganization, definitional rul-
ings is more difficult to support. The procedure does not explicitly
indicate that such definitional rulings will be issued if the stated con-
ditions are present. Indeed, the procedure assumes the existence of
section 306 stock. But the procedure does not indicate that a dis-
position must be planned before the Treasury will issue a ruling under
section 306(b) (4). Thus, the procedure enables the Treasury to
continue to issue pre-reorganization rulings under section 306(b) (4).
And by issuing such rulings, the government indicates its belief that
the widely held preferred shares of a publicly held corporation do not
constitute section 306 stock, if the conditions expressed in the rule of
thumb can be met.
D. Conclusion
In order to ascertain whether or not convertible preferred stock
issued in a corporate reorganization constitutes section 306 stock, one
is compelled by the lack of direction in the Code, the regulations and
the published revenue rulings and procedures to ask whether or not ordi-
nary preferred stock issued under identical circumstances would con-
stitute section 306 stock. The government appears to have adopted
such an approach in Revenue Procedure 66-34, the first published
procedure in which the government has demonstrated any awareness
of the fact that convertible preferred stock is a commodity distinct from
ordinary preferred.
In order to determine whether or not ordinary preferred stock
would constitute section 306 stock had it been issued in place of
convertible preferred, one initially must determine whether a pure or
modified cash substitution test is to be applied. Given the fact that
the most recent revenue ruling and revenue procedure which deal with
section 306 ... appear to support a modified cash substitution test, the
other than by redemption and other than in anticipation of a redemption, is
not pursuant to a plan of tax avoidance if the stock of the issuing corporation
is widely held and
(a) the "section 306 stock" is by its terms redeemable within
five years from the date of issuance, or
(b) the "section 306 stock" is not redeemable within five years
from the date of issuance but the issuing corporation will not repre-
sent that there will be no redemption (as a result of a change in the
terms of the stock, an invitation for tenders or otherwise) within five
years from the date of issuance.
Id. at 1234-35.
106 Rev. Rul. 60-1, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 143; Rev. Proc. 66-34, § 5, 1966-2 Cum.
BuiL. 1232, 1234.
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problem becomes one of applying the proper part of the two-part rule
of thumb set forth above. If part two is applicable, the problems
created by the pure cash substitution test must be resolved.
III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME: THE DISPOSITION OF CONVERTIBLE
PREFERRED, SECTION 306 STOCK
The road to non-section 306 stock status, then, is filled with pit-
falls and hurdles. But once section 306 stock status is ascertained, it
is not a foregone conclusion that an ordinary income tax, as opposed to
a capital gains tax, will be imposed upon disposition of section 306
shares. An analysis of the exceptions to section 306(a) (1) and (2) "1
suggests many ordinary circumstances under which convertible pre-
ferred, section 306 stock may be sold to a third party or to the issuing
corporation, either before or after conversion, without giving rise to an
ordinary income tax.0"s In order to explore the alternatives, let us
assume that, as the result of a statutory merger, shareholder A receives
in exchange for his common stock of Corporation X both common and
convertible preferred stock of Corporation Y, the surviving entity.
The book value of the common shares received, let us assume, is equal
to the par value of the common shares surrendered, while the par value
of the preferred shares received is equal to A's ratable share of the
accumulated earnings of Corporation X prior to the merger. Let us
assume, finally, that the convertible preferred shares received by A
are section 306 shares, and that their par value is equal to the book
value of A's newly received common stock."3'
A. Disposition by Way of Conversion and Sale
1. Sale of All Shares Prior to Conversion
If shareholder A sells all of his stock in the issuing corporation
prior to conversion, he generally will be taxed at capital gains, as
opposed to ordinary income rates. Section 306(b) (1) (A) provides
that section 306(a) will not be applied to a disposition which is not
a redemption, if the disposition terminates the entire stock interest of
the shareholder in the corporation.
Several conditions are placed upon the disposition, however. First,
the stock cannot be sold to the shareholder's spouse, children, grand-
1
0 7 See notes 96 and 97 supra.
108 It is clear that § 306(a) will not be applied if a shareholder gives his § 306
stock away. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 306(b) (3); see Rev. Rul. 57-328, 1957-2 Cum.
Bum. 229. Nor will § 306(a) be applied if § 306 stock is redeemed in a distribution
in partial or complete liquidation. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, §306(b)(2). But these
exceptions to §306 are less useful exceptions to §306(a) than §§306(b)(1) and
306(b) (4).
109 Shareholder A is actually in the same position as the shareholder in the hypo-
thetical case set forth at text accompanying note 32 supra.
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children or parents. Second, section 306(a) will continue to apply
if the shareholder's spouse, children, grandchildren or parents hold
stock in the surviving corporation after the shareholder himself disposes
of his shares, because section 306(b) (1) (A) requires application of
the family attribution rules set forth in section 318(a) (1)." ° Finally,
the rules of section 318 (a) (2) 11 with regard to attribution from
partnerships, estates, trusts and corporations will be applied. Thus,
A may be unable to establish, first, that he has sold his shares to a
permissible buyer and, second, that he has terminated his entire stock
interest in the surviving corporation." 2
2. Conversion of Preferred Shares in Year One and Sale of All
Shares in Year Two
If our hypothetical shareholder decides to convert his preferred
shares in one year and then to sell all of his stock in the surviving
corporation the following year, a new problem is created. Assuming
for the moment that section 306 status survives conversion, section
306(b) (1) (A) will enable the shareholder to escape ordinary income
treatment in the second year. But will there be an ordinary income
tax upon conversion? The question is whether conversion constitutes
a taxable event.
Arguably, conversion constitutes an "E" reorganization, in which
event it could not give rise to taxation." 3 The government, however,
apparently feels that a conversion is something distinct from a re-
capitalization. The distinction is merely semantic, however, for in a
special ruling issued in 1945, the government indicated that the con-
version of preferred stock into common pursuant to a conversion
privilege set forth in the share certificate resulted in no taxable income
or deductible loss." 4 Although neither citing precedent nor articulating
11o INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 318(a) (1). Section 306(b) (1) (A) (ii) states that
the disposition must not be "directly or indirectly, to a person the ownership of whose
stock would (under section 318(a)) be attributable to the shareholder . . . ," while
§ 306(b) (1) (A) (iii) states that the disposition must terminate the shareholder's
stock interest in the corporation, "(and for purposes of this clause, section 318(a)
shall apply)."
iii INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 318(a) (2).
1i2The relevant provisions of § 306(b) (1) (A) are set forth at note 110 sipra.
One author suggests that the § 318(a) attributees (including family attributees) sell
their shares in the corporation so that the holder of § 306 stock will not be taxable
at ordinary rates. Ponder, Current itses for preferred stock in tax plaming despite
prohibitions of sec 306, 4 J. TAXATION 277 (1956).
:1 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (E). An "E" reorganization is defined
as a recapitalization.
"14 Special Ruling dated February 23, 1945, cited in 4 CCH 1945 STAND. FED.
TAx RE'. 1 6151. A private ruling stating that there would be no tax upon conversion
of the convertible preferred shares issued in connection with Union Oil Company's
acquisition of Pure Oil Company, is cited in 4 CCH SINCIAIR-MuRRAY CAP. CHANGES
REP. P-345.
784 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:755
a rationale to support its position, the government undoubtedly relied
upon a regulation promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1918, pro-
viding that conversion of a bond into stock pursuant to a conversion
privilege contained in the bond does not result in the realization of
profit or loss, "the transaction not being closed . . until [the]
stock is sold." 11
Hence, conversion does not constitute a taxable event, and our
hypothetical shareholder will not be taxed upon the exchange of shares
in year one.
3. Conversion of Preferred in Year One and Sale of
One-Half Common in Year Two
If our hypothetical shareholder converts his preferred shares in
one year and, in the following year, sells one-half of his common stock
in the surviving corporation, a problem arises whether the proceeds
of the sale represent ordinary income under section 306, assuming that
those shares sold were obtained by way of conversion." In other
words, does section 306 characterization survive conversion? ...
Section 306(e) (1) "1" provides the answer:
If section 306 stock was issued with respect to common stock
and later such section 306 stock is exchanged for common
115 Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1563 (1920). The Regulation was found to be applicable
under the Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924, 1926 and 1936. Mim. 3156, 11-2 Cum. BULL.
24 (1923); I.T. 2216, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 19 (1925); I.T. 2347, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 86
(1927); G.C.M. 18436, 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 101; cf. I.T. 3056, 1937-1 Cum. BUL.
101, where the bondholders of M corporation converted their bonds into common
stock of 0 corporation pursuant to a conversion privilege. The conversion was held
to be a taxable event.
If conversion were considered to be a taxable event, it is interesting to speculate
as to how our hypothetical shareholder would be taxed. Arguably, any gain should
be taxed at ordinary rates, in that the shareholder is disposing of his § 306 stock-
the consideration being common stock rather than cash. On the other hand, preferred
stock loses its § 306 character upon conversion. See text accompanying notes 116-19
infra. Would taxation of gain at ordinary rates be justified, then, particularly in
view of the fact that conversion may mean no bailout?
110 This is a LIFO approach, which the government might take were it in fact
true that § 306 characterization survives conversion.
117 Section 306(c) (1) (C) initially appears to be relevant to the problem. This
section provides that stock the basis of which is determined by reference to the basis
of § 306 stock, constitutes § 306 stock. Clearly the common shares received by A
upon conversion in year one have the same basis as his old preferred stock, due to
the fact that conversion represents a non-taxable event Thus, it could be argued
that one-half of A's common shares following conversion do indeed constitute § 306
stock.
118 Section 306(e) (1) is a second exception to §306(c) (1) (C). The first ex-
ception, §306(c)(1)(B), provides that common stock received in a corporate
reorganization cannot be characterized as § 306 stock, even if received in exchange
for § 306 shares. In light of § 306(c)(1)(B), § 306(e)(1) would be superfluous,
were it not for the fact that the government has never considered a conversion to be
a form of corporate reorganization within the meaning of § 368(a) of the Code (i.e., a
recapitalization). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1954).
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stock in the same corporation . . . , then . . . the common
stock so received shall not be treated as section 306 stock
119
Thus, section 306 stock status does not survive conversion and
the sale of fifty per cent of A's common shares, following conversion,
could under no circumstances give rise to ordinary income.
4. Sale of All Preferred Shares Prior to Conversion
If our hypothetical shareholder sells all of his preferred shares
prior to conversion, he can neither escape ordinary income taxation
under the termination of interest exception to section 306 (a) discussed
above, nor can he assert that his stock has lost its section 306 char-
acter. Thus, section 306(b) (4) (A) becomes relevant to the problem.
Section 306(b) (4) (A) provides that section 306(a) will not apply
"if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate
• . that the distribution, and the disposition or redemption .
was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes
the avoidance of Federal income tax." 120 Thus, in order to avoid an
ordinary income tax, our hypothetical shareholder must establish
(a) that a principal purpose of the corporation in issuing his section
306 shares was not tax avoidance,' 2 and (b) that one of his principal
motives in disposing of his section 306 shares was not the desire to
avoid an ordinary income tax.'
Due to the brevity and scarcity of rulings dealing with section
306(b) (4) (A), it is difficult to ascertain the criteria by which cor-
porate purpose is to be judged. Apparently, the distribution of
119 Section 306(e) (1) might apply to a situation in which a corporation adds a
conversion privilege after preferred shares have been issued, and the privilege is
exercised. With respect to the addition of a conversion privilege, see DEL. CODE
AxN. tit. 8, § 151(e) (1953) ; 11 W. FLErCHER, PRivATE CoRPoRAio os § 5306 (perm.
ed. rev. 1958).
120The Secretary must be satisfied as to the non-existence of a tax avoidance
device. Thus one commentator has suggested that the standards set by the Secretary
are not reviewable in any court of law, including the Tax Court. Trimble, Treatment
of Preferred Stock Distributions 358.
121 It may be difficult to separate corporate from shareholder purpose upon initial
issuance of § 306 stock, particularly in the case of closely held corporations where
the board of directors is apt to consist of a majority of the shareholders. Brown,
Dooley & Egan, Some Tax Consequences of Stock Redemnptions and Partial Liquida-
tions, 38 CoNN. B.J. 294, 310-11 n_83 (1964).
122 It is interesting to note that Judge Arundell, dissenting in C.P. Chamberlin,
18 T.C. 164, 181 (1952), stated that a shareholder's intent (at the time of his receipt
of a preferred stock dividend) as to the disposition he would make of the dividend
should be irrelevant to the question of taxability upon disposition. Arundell chose
to focus upon the intent and action of the corporation at the time of distribution of
the dividend stock. Presumably he also considered shareholder motive upon dispo-
sition to be irrelevant.
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section 306 stock must serve some legitimate business purpose, other
than that of enabling shareholders to avoid an ordinary income tax."
It would appear that a legitimate purpose will be presumed if the
shares of the issuing corporation are widely or publicly held.'24 In
other cases a legitimate business purpose must be specifically estab-
lished. In the context of a reorganization, such a purpose could
consist of a desire to limit the new shareholders' participation in the
equity of the surviving or acquiring enterprise,'25 or of a desire to
consummate a merger or acquisition by use of an attractive security.
Thus, our hypothetical shareholder should be able to establish without
difficulty a valid business purpose for issuance of his convertible
securities.
In addition to establishing a valid business purpose for the issuance
of his section 306 shares, our hypothetical shareholder apparently must
establish, under the corporate purpose umbrella, the absence of an
intention on the part of the issuing corporation to redeem his section
306 stock shortly after distribution under the terms of a short-term
sinking fund program. 6 Most corporations that issue convertible
preferred stock as part of a corporate reorganization do not expect to
redeem the convertible shares shortly after distribution, except possibly
pursuant to the terms of a long-term sinking fund program.2 7 Thus
our hypothetical shareholder should be able to meet the second criterion
of the corporate purpose test.
'=3Rev. Rul. 56-116, 1956-1 Cum. Bu.. 164; Rev. Rul. 57-103, 1957-1 Cum.
BuLL. 113. The business purpose test may have been derived from the Tax Court
opinion in Chamberlin. 18 T.C. at 177-78. The Tax Court, in turn, relied upon its
opinion in Alice H. Bazley, 4 T.C. 897 (1945), aff'd, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
124 Rev. Rul. 57-212, 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 114 and Rev. Proc. 66-34, § 5, 1966-2
Cum. BULL. 1232, 1234, suggest the validity of this conclusion. In Revenue Ruling
57-212, the Service held that preferred stock issued with respect to common in a
statutory merger of two large publicly owned corporations would not be taxable
under § 306(a) when sold, despite the existence of a long-term sinking fund program.
Section 306(b) (4) (A) was cited, but no mention was made of a legitimate business
purpose for issuance of the § 306 shares. Reference was made to Rev. Rul. 56-116,
1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 164, however, and thus it can be assumed that the Service felt that
there was a valid business purpose due to public or widespread ownership. Revenue
Procedure 66-34 strengthens the conclusion as to when the government will assume a
valid business purpose under § 306(b) (4) (A). Section 5 of the procedure indicates
that a favorable ruling will be issued under § 306(b) (4) (A) if it is first established
that the stock of the issuing corporation is widely held. (A second condition must
also be met. See the discussion of the procedure at text accompanying notes 104-05
supra.)
= See Rev. Rul. 56-116, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 164.
128 Rev. Rul. 56-116, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 164 and Rev. Rul. 57-212, 1957-1 gum.
BULL. 114 so indicate. See Berger & Kanter, Shop Talk, 18 J. TAxATIoN 252 (1963) ;
Chapman, Exemption of 306 Stock 222-23. See also Rev. Proc. 66-34, § 5, 1966-2 CGum.
BULL. 1232, 1234.
1
27 As the introduction indicates, acquiring corporations which today are issuing
convertibles are doing so in order to insure a desired acquisition.
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There remains the task of establishing the lack of an improper
motive for the disposition of his section 306 shares. 2" If he is a
minority shareholder in the merged corporation, there should be no
difficulty. The Senate Report' specifically provides that section
306(b) (4) (A) applies to "isolated dispositions of section 306 stock
by minority shareholders who do not in the aggregate have control of
the distributing corporation." The report assumes that a minority
shareholder's principal motives in disposing of section 306 stock do
not include the desire to avoid federal income tax.130
If our hypothetical shareholder is not a minority shareholder, no
problems should arise if his section 306 shares are sold other than in
anticipation of their redemption pursuant to the terms of a short-term
sinking fund program established by the surviving corporation. As
Part I of this paper indicates, 3 '. the enactment of section 306 was
prompted by the Chamberlin tax avoidance device, whereby preferred
shares were issued pro rata to common shareholders who subsequently
sold the shares (incurring only a capital gains tax) with the realization
that the shares would be redeemed over a relatively short period of time
pursuant to the operation of an established, short-term redemption
program. Thus, sale of section 306 shares in anticipation of redemp-
tion pursuant to the terms of an established short-term sinking fund
program clearly would suggest a tax avoidance motive for the dis-
position of the section 306 shares, particularly in view of the fact that
redemption in the hands of the original shareholder would give rise
to an ordinary income, as opposed to a capital gains tax. Conversely,
the absence of shareholder anticipation of redemption pursuant to the
terms of a short-term sinking fund program would tend strongly to
suggest the absence of tax avoidance as a motivating force behind
the disposition.
An intention to dispose systematically of all of one's shares in the
surviving corporation would also tend to suggest the absence of tax
avoidance as a motivating force behind the disposition of section
306 shares. 2 Thus, if our hypothetical shareholder is not a minority
12 Rev. Proc. 66-34, § 5, 1966-2 CuM. BuLL. 1232, 1234, suggests the irrelevance
of shareholder motives. But the word "usually" which appears twice in § 5 of the
procedure will permit the government to consider shareholder motive, as it has in
the past.
129 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 243-44 (1954).
130A shareholder's former holdings in the acquired corporation would appear to
the Senate to be irrelevant, although query whether such holdings should be irrelevant.
A minority shareholder who owned most of the shares of the acquired enterprise
could have demanded the issuance of convertible stock, due to his desire to avoid an
ordinary income tax. And the issuing corporation, due solely to its desire to acquire
the closely held enterprise, could have acquiesced.
13 1 See text accompanying notes 12-29 supra.
132 Rev. Rul. 56-223, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 162 involved a situation in which the
§ 306 and common shares of retiring employees were to be purchased by the employer's
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shareholder, and if a short-term sinking fund program does exist, the
shareholder may be able to meet the motive-upon-disposition require-
ment of section 306(b) (4) (A) by establishing that he intends to
dispose of all of his shares in the surviving corporation over a short
period of time.
No other means of establishing a valid shareholder motive appear
to exist. Thus, under certain circumstances, our hypothetical share-
holder will be unable to meet at least one of the two requirements which
must be met before section 306(b) (4) (A) can be applied. In such
case, his entire gain or a portion thereof will be taxable at ordinary rates.
5. Sale of a Pro-Rata Portion of Common and
Preferred Prior to Conversion
If section 306(b) (4) (A) is inapplicable because of A's principal
desire to avoid an ordinary income tax upon disposition of his section
306 shares, A can escape section 306(a) treatment only by converting
some of his preferred shares prior to sale, or by selling his entire
stock interest in the issuing corporation. But if the inapplicability of
section 306(b) (4) (A) is posited on the grounds of corporate purpose
alone, an additional "out" remains." Section 306(b) (4) (B) pro-
vides that section 306(a) will not apply in the case of the disposition
of section 306 stock and a prior or simultaneous disposition of the stock
with respect to which the section 306 stock was issued, "if it is
established to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate .
that the disposition . . . of the section 306 stock . . . was not in
pursuance of a plan having" tax avoidance as one of its principal pur-
poses. This section would appear to permit our hypothetical share-
holder to dispose "safely" of a portion of his section 306 shares, given
a prior or simultaneous disposition of the common stock with respect
to which these shares were issued.'
8 4
However, the Senate Report and the regulations ..5 cast doubt upon
this interpretation. The illustration of section 306(b) (4) (B) set forth
qualified profit sharing trust over a six-year period. The Service held that the dis-
position was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal motives the
avoidance of federal income tax. See Trimble's comment on the ruling, Trimble,
Treatment of Preferred Stock Distribution 359-62.
183 Section 306(b) (4) (A) may be our hypothetical shareholder's only "out!' if
he wishes to retain his common stock in the issuing corporation and if he is unable
to convert his § 306 shares due to the expiration of the conversion privilege.
1834 Note that only the disposition need be for reasons other than tax avoidance.
See SEc-roN 306 STocK, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 85, at 48 (1963) ; Cohen,
Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Corporate
Distributions, Organizations, and Reorganizations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 393, 409 n.113
(1955).
135 S. REP. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1954) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.306-2(b) (3)
(1960).
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in the Senate Report and in the regulations suggests that section
306(b) (4)(B) is to apply only to the complete termination of a
shareholder's interest in the issuing corporation. The example indi-
cates that if a shareholder owns 100 shares of common stock, receives
100 shares of section 306 stock and sells the common first, sale of the
section 306 stock will not give rise to ordinary income.
The example has been criticized by many commentators, 136 and
rightly so in view of the fact that, given section 306(b)(1), the
example appears to render section 306(b) (4) (B) superfluous. Al-
though it could be argued that section 306(b) (4) (B) was added
to cover cases of the complete termination of a shareholder's interest
falling outside the protection of section 306(b) (1), due either to the
attribution rules ... or to section 306(b) (1)'s inapplicability to a
multi-step termination of a shareholder's interest in the issuing cor-
poration, 3 " such explanations are unsound. To accept the explanation
derived from the relevance of the attribution rules would be to render
section 306(b) (1)'s reference to section 318(a) meaningless, and to
read section 306(b) (1) so that it encompasses only one-step dis-
positions of a shareholder's entire stock interest in the issuing cor-
poration would be to narrow, without justification, the coverage of
section 306(b) (1).
There is no need to apply section 306(a) if a shareholder holds
no stock in the issuing corporation after the disposition of his section
306 shares, despite the fact that some of his shares in the issuing cor-
poration were sold prior to the terminating transaction. A bailout
cannot occur as the result of a terminating transaction, and thus
a definite rule setting forth the inapplicability of section 306(a) is
warranted. Realizing this, Congress enacted section 306(b) (1).
The example set forth in the Senate Report and the regulations,
then, does not indicate the scope of section 306(b) (4) (B). Section
306(b) (4) (B) must have independent significance, and if it is to
have such significance, it must be interpreted to cover pro rata dis-
positions of section 306 and underlying common stock."' Thus, if
Corporation W issues preferred, section 306 shares to its common
shareholders, and if, thereafter, shareholder S disposes of one-half of
136 E.g., Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions and Liqui-
dations Under the 1954 Code, U. So. CAL. 1955 TAx INST. 349, 401; Trimble, Treat-
neit of Preferred Stock Distributions 359.
137See Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs 950; Bittker, supra note 136, at 401;
Trimble, Treatment of Preferred Stock Distributions 359 n.65.
1.38See Bittker, stpra note 136, at 401-02.
139 SEcrioN 306 SToCk, TAx MANAGEMFT PoRTFoLIo No. 85, at 47 (1963);
Bittker, supra note 136, at 402; Lanahan, Stock Dividends and Section 306 Stock,
MARQ. U. 5TH INsT. O N FED. TAX. 65, 86 (1954); Schwaighart, Despite 306, pre-
ferred stock is still very usefil in corporate tax planning, 14 J. TAXATION 348, 349
(1961).
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his common stock and one-half of his newly issued preferred, he will
be taxable at capital gain rates under the provisions of section
306(b) (4) (B), if he can establish to the satisfaction of the Secretary
that the disposition of his shares was not in pursuance of a plan having
tax avoidance as one of its principal purposes. (If all common share-
holders of Corporation W acted in the same manner as S, there would
be an obvious bailout, so that S probably could not establish lack of
tax avoidance to the Secretary's satisfaction.)
An additional problem, not present in ordinary stock dividend
situations, is raised with respect to shareholders who receive section 306
stock in a corporate reorganization. As to such shareholders, what
stock constitutes the underlying common stock? Underlying common
stock in such cases should constitute the common shares of the acquir-
ing corporation which represent the common stock interest that the
shareholders gave up in the acquired enterprise. Under this definition,
the common shares received by A in the hypothetical corporate re-
organization would constitute underlying common stock. And thus
A might sell the same portion of his common and section 306 stock
prior to conversion without incurring an ordinary income tax, provided
that he can establish to the Secretary's satisfaction that the disposition
was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes
the avoidance of federal income tax. Further, the disposition of
preferred and common stock need not be simultaneous, provided that
the common shares are disposed of first.
6. Summary
To summarize, then, the following means of escaping section
306(a) (1) treatment exist:
(a) A shareholder may sell all of his stock in the
issuing corporation, provided that he sells to the proper indi-
viduals and provided that shares held by others in the
issuing corporation cannot be attributed to him. (Section
306(b) (1) (A).)
(b) A shareholder may convert his section 306 stock
into common and, at any time thereafter, sell one or more
of the common shares. (Section 306(e) (1).)
(c) A shareholder may sell some of his convertible pre-
ferred shares prior to conversion provided that he is able
to establish both a valid corporate purpose for issuance of
the convertible stock and the fact that one of his principal
motives in disposing of his section 306 shares was not
the desire to avoid an ordinary income tax. (Section
306(b) (4) (A).)
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(d) Finally, a shareholder may sell the same portion of
his section 306 and underlying common shares (simul-
taneously or the common first), provided that a principal
motive for disposition of the shares does not constitute tax
avoidance. (Section 306(b) (4) (B).)
B. Disposition by Way of Conversion and Redemption
All of our hypothetical shareholder's section 306 stock need not
be sold to a third party under the circumstances described above in
order to enable him to escape an ordinary income tax. Because of
the provisions of section 306(b) which deal with redemption, the
shareholder, under specific circumstances, may escape a penalty by
"sale" to the issuing corporation as well.' 40
1. Redemption of All Shares
If the issuing corporation redeems all of the shareholder's stock
in the corporation, section 306(b) (1) (B) will generally permit him
to escape an ordinary income tax. Section 306(b) (1) (B) provides
that subsection (a) will not apply if the disposition is by way of
redemption and if section 302(b) (3) applies. Section 302(b) (3), in
turn, provides that a capital gains tax will be imposed "if the re-
demption is in complete redemption of all of the stock of the cor-
poration owned by the shareholder."
A problem does arise, however, in view of the fact that, under
certain circumstances set forth in section 302 (c) (2), the family attribu-
tion rules of section 318(a) (1) must be applied to a distribution de-
scribed in section 302(b) (3).14 Further, the rules concerning attribu-
tion from partnerships, estates, trusts and corporations must be applied
under section 302(b) (3) in order to determine whether or not a
redemption terminates a shareholder's entire equity interest in the
corporation. Presumably, Congress felt that these limitations upon
section 302 (b) (3) would be applied when reference was made to section
302(b) (3) pursuant to the provisions of section 306(b) 
(1) (B). 14
140 This section will not consider partial liquidations.
141 The family attribution rules must be applied: (1) if, given a tax avoidance
motive, any portion of the stock redeemed was acquired within the ten-year period
ending on the date of the distribution by the distributee from a person the ownership
of whose stock would be attributable, to the distributee at the time of the distribution;
(2) if, given a tax avoidance motive any person owns, at the time of the distribution,
stock the ownership of which is attributable to the distributee and such person ac-
quired any stock in the corporation from the distributee within the ten-year period
ending on the date of the distribution; or (3) if the distributee acquires an interest
in the redeeming corporation within ten years from the date of the distribution.
14 2 See Dauber, Beware these two "loopholes" to get preferred-stock bailout
unIder 1954 Code, 2 J. TAxAiox 75, 77 (1955) ; cf. Ponder, supra note 112, at 278;
Schwaighart, spra note 139, at 348.
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Thus, under certain circumstances, our hypothetical shareholder will
be taxed under section 306(a), despite the fact that all shares held
personally by him are redeemed by the issuing corporation.
2. Conversion of Preferred and Redemption
Thereafter of the Former Preferred
If our hypothetical shareholder converts his section 306 stock,
there will be no tax upon conversion. 43 Nor will the shares retain
their section 306 character.'44 Thus, upon redemption of his former
section 306 shares, taxability will depend upon the provisions of section
302. Only if the redemption is (a) in complete termination of the
shareholder's interest in the corporation,'145 (b) substantially dispro-
portionate 14> or (c) not essentially equivalent to a dividend, 47 will the
capital gain provisions of the Code be applied; otherwise, there will be
ordinary income.
3. Redemption of All Preferred Stock Prior to Conversion
If our hypothetical shareholder elects not to convert his section 306
stock, and if the issuing corporation decides to redeem the shares, the
shareholder will be forced to turn to section 306(b) (4) (A) for relief
from section 306(a) treatment. Section 306(b) (4) (A) deals not
only with dispositions by way of sale to third parties, but also with
redemptions. Thus, if the shareholder can establish to the satisfaction
of the Secretary or his delegate that both the distribution and re-
demption of section 306 stock were not in pursuance of a plan having
tax avoidance as a principal purpose, section 306 (a) will not be applied.
As in the case of a sale of section 306 stock, the shareholder must
establish that a principal corporate purpose for the distribution of
section 306 stock was not the avoidance of federal income taxes. 48
But to establish that the redemption itself was not in pursuance of a
plan having tax avoidance as one of its principal purposes, the share-
holder must produce evidence of a non-tax avoidance corporate-as
opposed to shareholder-purpose for the redemption, because it is the
corporation rather than the shareholder that is ultimately responsible for
the redemption. As a practical matter, however, shareholder purpose,
particularly if the corporation is closely held, will become crucial. 49
14
3 See text accompanying notes 113-15 mtpra.
144 See text accompanying notes 116-19 supra.
14 5 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 302(b) (3).
14, Id. §302(b) (2).
147 Id. § 302(b) (1).
148 See.text accompanying notes 120-27 supra.
'
4 9 See Brown, Dooley & Egan, supra note 121.
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Published revenue rulings suggest only one corporate purpose for
the redemption of section 306 stock which can withstand attack under
section 306(b) (4) (A) : adherence to the terms of a long-term sinking
fund program. " ° Other non-tax oriented corporate motives for the
redemption of section 306 stock undoubtedly exist, however, and thus
each case must be judged individually."'
But assuming that the requirements of section 306(b) (4) (A)
can be met, our hypothetical shareholder is not home free. Redemp-
tions are specifically covered by section 302 and, under current law,
redemptions of section 306 stock must be tested under section 302
once the inapplicability of section 306(a) is established by reason of
section 306(b) (4) (A)."" Thus, pursuant to the terms of section
302(d), the provisions of section 301 will be applied so that our hypo-
thetical shareholder will be taxable at ordinary rates upon the dis-
position of his section 306 shares, unless one of the three exceptions
to section 302(d) does in fact apply." 3 In the case of our hypo-
thetical shareholder, as in most instances, proof will be required that
"the redemption [was] not essentially equivalent to a dividend." '
10 Rev. Rul. 57-212, 1957-1 Cumr. BuuL. 114; see Kanter, Preferred Stock in
"B" Reorganization 99.
151 The Service apparently will not issue rulings on the applicability of § 306(b)
(4) (A) to redemptions until a redemption is planned, unless the § 306 shares in
question cannot and will not be redeemed within five years from issuance. Rev.
Proc. 66-34, § 5, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 1232, at 1234.
For a discussion of the Service's policy with respect to redemption rulings under
§306(b) (4) (A) prior to August of 1966, see Berger & Kanter, Shop Talk, 18 J.
TAXATION 252 (1963) ; Chapman, Exemption of 306 Stock 221.
152 See SEcrION 306 STocK, TAx MANAGEMENT PoRTFoLio No. 85, at 50-51. Rev.
Rul. 56-654, 1956-2 Cum. BuI.L. 216, specifically indicates that upon the redemption
of possible § 306 shares, reference should be made to both 3§ 302 and 306 of the Code.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 57-212, 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 114, where § 306(a) (2) was found to be
inapplicable, but no mention was made of the relevance of § 302.
13 An argument could be made that once § 306 stock is posited, and once § 306(a)
is found to be inapplicable due solely to § 306(b) (4) (A), the inquiry should terminate.
The fact that the draftsmen of § 306 specifically referred to § 302 in § 306(b) (1) (B)
suggests that § 302 would be inapplicable absent such reference. Further, it is arguable
that reference to § 302 after the requirements of § 306(b) (4) (A) have been met
would lead to results inconsistent with the statutory scheme. In many, if not most,
cases, a shareholder whose § 306 stock is redeemed will be unable to meet the sub-
stantially disproportionate redemption requirements of § 302(b) (2). Thus, if § 302
is to be applied, the requirements of § 302(b) (1) must be met for a shareholder to
escape an ordinary income tax. But § 302(b) (1) sets forth a dividend equivalence
test which no shareholder holding § 306 stock should be able to meet. This is because
a net effect test based upon the net effect test which evolved under the predecessor
of § 302(b) (1) will be applied in determining the presence or absence of § 306 stock
under all the dividend equivalence tests which can be applied under § 306(c) (1) (B),
given the inapplicability of the Bedford doctrine under a pure cash substitution test.
If the Bedford doctrine were applied, dividend equivalence could be found despite
the impact of the net effect test developed under § 302(b) (1). Thus, if - 302 must
be applied after the requirements of § 306(b) (4) (A) have been met, it is arguable
that reference to redemptions in § 302(b) (4) (A) becomes meaningless.
Two problems are created by this analysis, however. First, a business purpose
test, in addition to a net effect test, can be applied under § 302(b) (1) as well as under
§ 306(b) (4) (A), so that arguably, if §306(b) (4) (A) is found to be applicable, the
shareholder can escape an ordinary income tax under § 302(b) (1) as well. (S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1954), indicates that the tests developed under
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4. Redemption of One-Half Common and One-Half Preferred
Prior to Conversion
If the issuing corporation redeems one-half of our hypothetical
shareholder's preferred shares, simultaneously with or following a re-
demption of the common shares with respect to which these preferred
shares were issued, section 306(b) (4) (B) will enable him to escape
section 306(a) treatment as to the preferred shares provided that he
can establish to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that
the redemption of section 306 stock was not in pursuance of a plan
having tax avoidance as one of its principal purposes.' 5 But again,
shareholder A will be home free only if he can establish that, pur-
suant to the terms of section 302(b) (1), "the redemption [was] not
essentially equivalent to a dividend," or that, pursuant to the terms
of section 302(b) (2), the redemption was "substantially dis-
proportionate."
5. Summary
To summarize, then, the redemption of convertible preferred,
section 306 shares will give rise to a capital gains, as opposed to an
ordinary income tax:
§ 115(g) (1) of the 1939 Code should be applied in interpreting § 302(b) (1). Under
the 1939 Code, several courts developed a busines purpose test. See, e.g., Phelps v.
Commissioner, 247 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1957). Under the present Code, the Tax Court
and Court of Claims have referred to business purpose. Neff v. United States, 305 F.2d
455 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Thomas J. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71 (1960). And the government
will not disregard business purpose, although emphasis will be placed upon net effect.
Rev. Rul. 55-515, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 222; Rev. Rul. 56-103, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 159;
Rev. Rul. 56-521, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 174; Rev. Rul. 57-353, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 223.)
Even accepting the fact that a business purpose test can be applied under § 302
(b) (1), however, it is clear that some courts will disregard business purpose. Under
the 1939 Code the Second and Third Circuits looked only to net effect. Northup v.
United States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F2d 943
(3d Cir. 1957). But see the discussion in Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192,
197-98 (4th Cir. 1962). And those courts which will apply a business purpose test
will also consider net effect Research has revealed only two cases in which an
essentially pro rata redemption was not treated as a dividend because of what the
court considered to be an overriding corporate business purpose. Davis v. United
States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967) ; Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir.
1954) ; see Ballenger v. United States, supra at 197-98.
Thus, the existence of a business purpose test does not substantially undermine
the theory expressed at the outset of this note. But the second problem created by
the analysis does. Although the same net effect tests will generally be applied under
§§ 302(b) (1) and 306(c) (1) (B), given the inapplicability of the Bedford doctrine,
the tests will be applied at different times, so that the results need not be the same.
Thus, it is not clear that § 302(b) (1) sets forth a dividend equivalence test which
even most shareholders holding § 306 stock should be unable to meet.
154 INT. REV. CoDr of 1954, § 302(b) (1). In most cases, the redemption will not
be substantially disproportionate, id. § 302(b) (2), and the example assumes that A
retains his common stock so that the redemption will not be in complete termination
of his equity interest in the corporation. Id. § 302(b) (3).
155 See Bittker, .rpra note 136, at 402, and the discussion of § 306(b) (4) (B),
at text accompanying notes 148-51 mspra.
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(a) if the redemption is in complete termination of the
shareholder's equity interest in the issuing corporation (sec-
tions 306(b) (1) (B) and 302(b) (3));
(b) if the shares are actually converted prior to redemp-
tion and the requirements of section 302(b) (1), (2) or (3)
can be met;
(c) (i) if it can be established to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the distribution and redemption of the shares
were not in pursuance of a plan having tax avoidance as one
of its principal purposes (section 306(b) (4) (A)), and (ii)
if the requirements of section 302(b) (1) can be met; or
(d) (i) if the common shares, with respect to which the
convertible shares were issued, are simultaneously redeemed
(or were previously redeemed), (ii) if it can be established to
the satisfaction of the Secretary that the redemption of section
306 stock was not in pursuance of a plan having tax avoidance
as one of its principal purposes (section 306(b) (4) (B)),
and (iii) if the requirements of section 302(b) (1) or (2)
can be met.
IV. SUGGESTED REVISIONS IN THE LAW
Although convertible redeemable preferred shares have become
popular primarily for business reasons, their popularity has been caused
in part by the fact that shareholders of corporations to be acquired
do not believe that convertible preferred shares will be regarded, or
taxed upon disposition, as section 306 stock. Analysis of the Code,
the regulations and the published rulings and revenue procedures indi-
cates the validity of this conclusion. Although it may be difficult to
establish the non-section 306 status of convertible preferred shares
issued in a corporate reorganization, the holder of convertible preferred,
section 306 stock can dispose of his section 306 shares so as to avoid
an ordinary income tax without great inconvenience.
Because there are many situations in which the issuance of con-
vertible preferred stock as part of a corporate reorganization will not
enable shareholders to bail earnings and profits out of an enterprise
without diluting their existing equity position, the fact that share-
holders of an acquired corporation can safely assume that such stock
will not constitute or will not be taxed upon disposition as section 306
stock is not intolerable. But there are several ways in which the law
might be revised so that results more consistent with the purpose of
section 306 might be achieved on a uniform basis.
A. Suggested Regulations
First, the Treasury should issue a regulation to the effect that
convertible preferred stock must be treated as ordinary preferred for
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the purpose of determining its section 306 character. Because it is
impossible to determine at the outset whether or not convertible pre-
ferred stock will be converted, and thus whether or not its bailout
potential will be eliminated, convertible preferred shares initially should
be regarded as ordinary preferred. The Treasury will apparently treat
all convertible preferred as ordinary preferred,'56 but a regulation re-
quiring the Service to do so would be helpful in achieving proper and
consistent results.
In addition, a regulation revamping the current cash substitution
test should be issued. All references to section 356 in the current test
should be eliminated so that a revised cash substitution test might
read as follows:
Ordinarily, section 306 stock includes stock which is not
common stock received in pursuance of a plan of reorganiza-
tion (within the meaning of section 368(a)) or received in
a distribution or exchange to which section 355 (or so much
of section 356 as relates to section 355) applies if cash re-
ceived in lieu of such stock would have been treated as a
distribution to which section 301 applies by virtue of section
302(d) or otherwise.'57
Such a test would eliminate the various questions which have been
raised by a section 356-oriented cash substitution test: the applicability
of the Bedford doctrine; the relevance of the dividend-within-gain rule;
and the impact of hypothetical cash upon the continuing qualification
of the underlying transaction as a tax-free exchange and thus upon
the continuing applicability of section 356. The elimination of these
problems would permit concentration upon the essential question raised
by section 306(c) (1) (B) (ii)-the "net effect" of the transaction.
A revised cash substitution test should be coupled with a state-
ment indicating that newly issued convertible preferred or preferred
shares cannot be excluded from the category of section 306 because of:
1. The publicly held nature of the issuing corporation
and the fact that the shares are widely held; or
2. The fact that the shares were not issued in pursuance
of a tax avoidance scheme.
15 6 See the discussion of Rev. Proc. 66-34, §4, at text accompanying notes
55-59 supra.
15 7 In eliminating the reference to § 356, I have no difficulty with the fact that in a
reorganization context, the taxability of "boot" is dependent upon the provisions of
§ 356. The cash substitution test creates a hypothetical situation by substituting hypo-
thetical cash for what might be § 306 stock. The cash substitution test can thus go
further and assume that even in a reorganization context, hypothetical cash must be
judged, for purposes of § 306, under the net effect criteria of §302, rather than under
the dividend equivalence test of § 356.
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Such a statement would appear to contradict the government's cur-
rent practice,:"" but would clearly be in line with the purpose of section
306. A bailout of earnings and profits may occur by means of the
issuance of additional shares of stock, despite the non-tax avoidance
motives of the issuing corporation and its shareholders, and despite
the publicly held nature of the issuing corporation and the widely held
nature of its newly issued shares.
B. Suggested Changes in the Statute
In addition to issuance of the suggested regulations, two major
changes-each concerning the disposition of section 306 stock-should
be made in section 306 itself. First, an exception to section 306(a)
should be added to section 306(b), permitting the holder of convertible
preferred section 306 stock to sell his stock (to the issuing corporation
or to a third party) prior to conversion without incurring an ordinary
income tax under section 306 if he can establish (in the event that his
and other convertible shares were issued as part of a corporate reorgani-
zation to the shareholders of an acquired corporation) that over fifty
per cent of the convertible shares issued to shareholders of the acquired
corporation were converted prior to his sale, or (in the event that he
received his convertible shares as an ordinary stock dividend) that over
fifty per cent of the issued dividend shares were converted prior to his
sale. As a practical matter, such a provision will aid only shareholders
of a closely held corporation. But as to such shareholders, it will take
into account the fact that conversion, prior to the sale, by shareholders
other than the selling shareholder, will adversely affect the selling
shareholder's equity interest in the enterprise. If shareholders holding
less than fifty per cent of the outstanding convertible shares convert
prior to the sale, the adverse effect will be negligible, but if share-
holders holding over fifty per cent of the outstanding convertible shares
convert prior to the sale, the effect will be sufficiently adverse to permit
the conclusion that the sale of convertible preferred by one shareholder
prior to conversion could not give rise to a classic bailout of earnings
and profits.
In addition, subsection (b) (4) of section 306 should be eliminated.
Just as motive should be irrelevant for purposes of determining the
section 306 status of preferred or convertible preferred stock, so should
motive be irrelevant for purposes of determining the manner in which
section 306 stock is to be taxed upon disposition. As this article has
repeatedly suggested, a bailout of earnings and profits may occur
158 See the discussion of the suggested two part rule of thumb, at text accom-
panying notes 91-105 supra.
798 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:755
despite the motives of a corporation or its shareholders upon the dis-
tribution or disposition of section 306 stock.
C. Conclusion
Adoption of the changes outlined above would surely reduce the
popularity of convertible preferred (and ordinary preferred) as a
vehicle for mergers and acquisitions. Convertible preferred would
more frequently be regarded as section 306 stock, while the provisions
of section 306(a) would more frequently be applied upon disposition
of the shares. But the suggested changes would lead to results more
consistent with the purpose of section 306-to discourage preferred
stock bailouts.
